Accountability at the Local Level in Fragile Contexts: Nepal Case Study by Cima, Ottavia
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability at the Local Level  
in Fragile Contexts: Nepal Case Study 
 
Ottavia Cima 
April 2013 
 
IDS WORKING PAPER  
Volume 2013 No 421 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability at the Local Level in Fragile Contexts: Nepal Case Study 
Ottavia Cima 
IDS Working Paper 421 
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in April 2013 
© Institute of Development Studies 2013 
ISSN: 2040-0209 ISBN: 978-1-78118-112-6 
 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may 
be made only under the following conditions: 
• with the prior permission of the publisher; or 
• with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London 
W1P 9HE, UK, 
or from another national licensing agency; or 
• under the terms set out below. 
 
This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for resale. 
Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other circumstances, or for  
re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publisher and a fee may be 
payable. 
 
Available from: 
Communications Unit, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 915637     Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202 
E-mail: bookshop@ids.ac.uk 
Web: www.ids.ac.uk/publications 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338) 
 3 
Accountability at the Local Level in Fragile Contexts: Nepal Case Study 
Ottavia Cima 
 
Summary 
This paper presents the Nepal case study from a research project on accountability carried 
out in three countries. The research project aimed at identifying practices and factors 
contributing to the success of accountability initiatives in fragile contexts In the case of Nepal, 
the research focused on the relationship between the state and its citizens and on the 
accountability mechanisms operating on the supply side and demand side of that 
relationship. This relationship was observed in the framework of a trail bridge project 
implemented with a community approach and including the Public Audit Practice, an 
accountability tool developed in Nepal by Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation.  
 
This paper argues that the public meetings held in the framework of the Public Audit Practice, 
as well as the trail bridge user committee, represent participatory spaces that are created by 
the project organisation but whose boundaries and internal functioning are shaped by (in part 
pre-existing) power relations. Furthermore, the active engagement of villagers in these 
spaces can represent an opportunity for ‘empowerment’, mostly in the form of the building of 
a network of useful contacts within and outside the community. However, in a context of 
polarised power structures and discriminatory social and cultural traditions, the meaningful 
participation of traditionally disadvantaged groups is limited.  
 
The findings also suggest that, in this context, accountability, and in particular the 
information-sharing process, assumes rather informal forms. This has to be considered in the 
planning of interventions so that the positive potential can be exploited and the risk of 
exclusion inherent to informal practices can be reduced.  
 
Finally, the paper argues that it is the space of the user committee that represents an 
accountability tool, while the space of the Public Audit Practice is more a symbolic one that 
can be used to build trust in, and legitimacy of, the actors involved.  
 
 
 
Key words: Accountability, social accountability, Nepal, participation, participatory spaces, 
development intervention, international organisations, NGOs, empowerment 
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1 Introduction 
Approaches to development interventions have been changing markedly over the years and 
decades. The idea of development from the grassroots, with the active involvement of local 
population in its own development, has slowly taken the place of more central approaches 
promoting interventions driven from above by development institutions. The state, of course, 
is a central actor in development and should be the set of institutions that ensures both basic 
rights and basic services for its citizens. However, historically states have often played the 
opposite role, oppressing their citizens, limiting their liberties and hampering an inclusive and 
long-lasting development.  
Over the decades, the attitude of development institutions towards the figure of the state has 
undergone many changes, too. While at the very beginning development aid was channelled 
directly into governmental finances, experiences of corruption, hijacking of development 
funds and little effectiveness of aid led to a shift in the focus of aid to the grassroots level. In 
recent times, the state has slowly regained the attention of agencies and donors, which are 
increasingly trying to involve state institutions in the delivery of developmental aid and in the 
implementation of developmental projects (Ellis and Biggs 2001).  
Furthermore, concepts of good governance and citizenship have found new space in the 
development discourse, with developmental intervention focusing on the building of a trusting 
relationship between the state and its citizens besides more traditional fields. In this 
relationship, accountability represents a crucial element: in order to build that trusting 
relationship, power holders have to be answerable to and responsive towards the ones who 
are affected by that power; and the latter should play an active role in holding the former to 
account.  
A study conducted by a research team of the Institute of Development Studies (henceforth 
IDS) of the University of Sussex (McGee and Gaventa 2011) reviewed the still-young 
research field of accountability and transparency initiatives. Although the impact of such 
initiatives as well as their correlation with improved development outputs has not been widely 
assessed, the IDS study outlines the emerging evidence of that impact and the need for 
further in depth research.  
Although Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation1 (henceforth HELVETAS) has always been 
attentive to the relationship between the state and its citizens, in recent years the 
organisation has been increasing its attention on issues of good governance and 
accountability, promoting specific projects in this field. The Governance and Peace team of 
HELVETAS’s head office thus joined forces with IDS to undertake the present research study 
on HELVETAS-supported accountability initiatives. On the one hand HELVETAS is 
interested in deepening knowledge, both within the organisation and in the development 
community in general, about the functioning and impact of accountability initiatives. The 
increased learning should support HELVETAS in formulating its policies and implementing its 
projects in an innovative way based on knowledge and experience. On the other hand, the 
numerous HELVETAS accountability initiatives in various countries all around the world 
constitute a rich basis of experience and empirical data for academic researchers wanting to 
deepen knowledge about accountability. 
                                                 
1 Helvetas, the Swiss non-governmental organization for development and cooperation founded in 1955, is nowadays known as 
HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation after merger with Intercooperation, another Swiss organization, in 2011. In this report, I refer 
in general to HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation as HELVETAS. I use the former name Helvetas whenever I refer specifically to 
activities that took place before 2010. 
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The contexts in which HELVETAS projects are operating are often ‘fragile’ ones, namely 
contexts where the state institution is weak and faces problems of legitimacy and 
effectiveness2. The above-mentioned IDS study (McGee and Gaventa 2011) states that 
research on accountability initiatives has been conducted mostly in democratic environments 
and thus the present study aims at broadening the knowledge about such initiatives in fragile 
contexts. Three countries – Nepal, Mozambique and Bangladesh – have been selected 
among the countries where HELVETAS is working. The present report is the result of the 
research conducted in Nepal.   
The investigation in Nepal is focused on the Public Audit Practice (PAP) as a relatively long-
standing initiative whose primary aim is to promote HELVETAS’ downward accountability 
towards the community of beneficiaries. However, at the same time the initiative contributes 
to the empowerment of both citizens and state, to the diffusion of discourses on democracy 
and good governance and thus to the strengthening of public and social accountability. The 
research in Nepal aims at analysing the various factors that influence, positively or 
negatively, the success of the Public Audit Practice, as an example of an accountability 
initiative at local level.  
1.1 Structure of the report 
After this introduction, the conceptual background of the study is presented in the following 
chapter, which discusses the very broad and often vague concepts that are central for the 
rest of the paper: accountability, participation and fragility. The characteristics of the Nepali 
context are presented in the third chapter, with a specific focus on the governance structure 
and on development interventions and HELVETAS’ engagement in the country. The same 
chapter describes the Public Audit Practice initiative and the Trail Bridge Support Unit, the 
project on which the research was implemented. The fourth chapter outlines the specific 
conceptual framework of the study and defines its research questions. The following chapter 
on methodology presents the general methodological approach of the study and describes 
the implementation of the research and of the methodological tools. The findings are 
illustrated in the sixth chapter. The last chapter, after the general conclusions of the study, 
proposes some recommendations for the planning and implementation of accountability 
initiatives and concludes the report by outlining some possible paths for further research.  
2 Conceptual background 
This chapter introduces the central concepts underlying the present study (accountability, 
fragility and other related concepts like participation and power) and situates them in the 
broad academic as well as practitioner discourse. 
                                                 
2 See next chapter for a detailed definition of fragility and for the reasons behind choosing Nepal as an example of fragile 
country. 
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2.1 Accountability  
With the paradigm shift in development thinking in the late 1980s and then more profoundly 
in the 1990s, concepts like bottom up development, participation, pro-poor growth, 
decentralisation and finally also accountability have spread in the development discourses 
(Ellis and Biggs 2001). Accountability is intended both as a goal per se, inasmuch as it is a 
crucial element of good governance; and as a means to improve aid effectiveness. However, 
in the last two decades the word accountability has been used so many times by so many 
different scholars and actors in the field and in so many different contexts that it has become 
‘a malleable and often nebulous concept, with connotations that change with the context and 
agenda’ (Newell 2006:39). Thus, it is important firstly to sketch out the components of 
accountability, as they are presented in the academic and practitioner discourse, and 
secondly to find a working definition for the framework of this research project.  
Accountability can be generally described as follows:  
Broadly speaking, accountability refers to the process of holding actors responsible 
for their actions. More specifically, it is the concept that individuals, agencies and 
organisations (public, private and civil society) are held responsible for executing their 
powers according to a certain standard…  
(Tisné 2010 in McGee and Gaventa 2011:13) 
In traditional definitions of accountability two elements are central: answerability, both the 
right for demanding and getting an answer and the duty to provide it, and enforceability, the 
system of sanctioning accountability failures (Newell and Wheeler 2006). Accountability is 
basically a relation between someone who holds any type of power and someone who is in 
any way affected by that power. Thus, accountability can assume myriad different aspects, 
depending on the kind of actors involved, the kind of power exercised and the kind of 
mechanisms activated. According to these differentiations, authors present numerous 
conceptualisations of subcategories of accountability. However, it is important to underline 
that one single type of accountability is rarely at work independently from the other types and 
that accountability practices do not follow a linear chronological process. Rather, the various 
manifestations of accountability relations should be understood as a ‘cycle of negotiation and 
conflict’, where different types of accountability strategies come into play in different 
moments (Newell and Wheeler 2006). The interplay of different accountability forms can lead 
to mutual strengthening or to new forms of hybrid accountability (Malena et al. 2004). The 
following paragraphs provide a selected overview of the main differentiations and 
categorisations of accountability (Newell and Bellour 2002; Newell 2006).  
Whenever state actors and public resources are involved, ‘public accountability’ is the 
relevant term, referring to the relationship between the state (at its different levels) and its 
citizens. Some authors argue that accountability is what distinguishes an authoritarian regime 
from a democracy (Newell 2006); a government can be defined as accountable if it is 
responsive towards the electorate’s preferences about its decisions and policies (Peruzzotti 
and Smulovitz 2006). Elections are the primary instrument of political accountability, in that 
they should guarantee some control over the behaviour of state actors; elections should act 
as a deterrent against misuse of power through fear of non (re)election. However, it is 
broadly attested that elections are not sufficient to guarantee the accountability of a 
government, since many ways can be found to bypass the actual electoral response, 
especially corruption and election manipulation among others (Malena et al. 2004). Thus, in a 
democratic system the ‘vertical’ mechanism of elections is accompanied by other ‘horizontal’ 
mechanisms of control, namely tools implemented within the state’s institutional framework 
(Newell 2006; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). More generally, vertical accountability refers 
to the relationship between actors on different hierarchical levels (e.g. state–citizens, donor–
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agency, agency–beneficiaries) while horizontal accountability takes place between actors on 
similar levels of a hierarchy, within one institution (e.g. a development agency), or between 
institutions within one institutional family (e.g. the judiciary and the executive within the state). 
Internal checks and balances are an example of horizontal accountability mechanisms 
(O’Donnell 2003).  
A further differentiation can be made between the ‘demand side’ and the ‘supply side’ of the 
accountability relation (Malena et al. 2004). Supply side refers to formal power holders. 
Conversely, demand side refers to the actors who do not hold that power but who demand 
accountability and responsiveness from the actors who do. In the framework of political 
accountability demand side refers to the mechanisms through which citizens hold their 
government to account.  
Among other types of accountability on the demand side is ‘social accountability’, i.e. all 
kinds of accountability mechanisms relying on the civic engagement of individual citizens, 
NGOs, social movements, civic associations, media and, in general, civil society actors 
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). Traditional tools of social accountability are collective 
actions like public demonstrations, protests, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism 
and public interest lawsuits (Malena et al. 2004). However, a new generation of tools has 
been developed in recent years, promoted mostly in the framework of participatory 
development intervention: participatory public policy making; participatory budgeting; citizen 
monitoring and evaluation of public service delivery; and public expenditure tracking and 
social auditing, among others (Malena et al. 2004). Malena et al. (2004:4) propose a 
categorisation of social accountability mechanisms based on five variables:  
(i) whether they are initiated by citizens or the state;3  
(ii) the extent to which they are ‘institutionalised’ vs. ‘independent’; 
(iii) the extent to which they are ‘collaborative’ vs. ‘conflictive’; 
(iv) whether they employ formal or informal sanctions; 
(v) whether they occur at the local, regional or national level.  
Joshi and Houtzager (2012) criticise the ‘messiness’ (ibid. 8) of the use of the concept of 
social accountability by scholars and practitioners and propose the identification of key 
elements of social accountability as follows:  
• requesting information; 
• monitoring; 
• making demands and demanding justification; 
• invoking formal grievances procedures; 
• holding demonstrations. 
Moreover, drawing on Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006), the authors define the ‘common core’ 
of all social accountability actions: ‘they are undertaken collectively through mobilising the 
grassroots; they involve making demands for information and failures of services ‘public’; and 
expect to work through imposing political and reputational costs’ (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012: 
150). 
Besides accountability of state to citizen, another discourse in the development field is on the 
accountability of development agencies. These agencies have been criticised for focusing 
too much on their own accountability to donors instead of beneficiaries (Newell and Bellour 
2002; Newell 2006). In this framework the term ‘downward accountability' is used to define 
                                                 
3 Some hold that other power holders can be as relevant as the state when discussing accountability relationships, e.g. private 
sector actors. 
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the accountability of agencies towards beneficiaries, in contrast to their accountability 
towards donors (HELVETAS Switzerland, n.d.b)4. In a broader sense, ‘downward’ refers to 
every kind of accountability relation from a powerful actor towards a less powerful one. The 
concept of accountability, as well as initiatives promoting accountability, has attracted 
growing interest among agencies and donors. As a response to the critique, initiatives have 
been launched to improve the downward accountability of agencies, for example by 
introducing auditing mechanisms in the project cycle.  
At the same time, development agencies and donors have become increasingly interested in 
programmes that act on the relationship between the state and its citizens in order to 
promote and improve public accountability. The reasons for engaging in such initiatives vary 
among the various agencies; however, they mostly rely on a set of assumptions and 
hypothesis about the causal links between improved accountability and both improved good 
governance and intervention effectiveness (McGee and Gaventa 2011; specifically on social 
accountability Malena et al. 2004). Thus, besides being a goal and desirable per se, 
accountability is often pursued as a means to increase the effectiveness of aid or, generally, 
of service-delivery. Furthermore, promoting social accountability is seen as a means within a 
process of empowerment, a concept that like accountability has had increased diffusion in 
development discourse since the 1990s:  
[b]y providing critical information on rights and entitlements and soliciting systematic 
feedback from poor people, social accountability mechanisms provide a means to 
increase and aggregate the voice of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. This 
enhanced voice empowers the poor and increases the chance of greater 
responsiveness on the part of the state to their needs  
(Malena et al. 2004:5).  
More generally, accountability initiatives (not only social accountability ones) are supposed to 
empower the actors with which they are engaging, whether civil society or state actors.  
The IDS study (McGee and Gaventa 2011) highlights the limited empirical evidence of the 
described causal relations: in fact, as initiatives focusing specifically on accountability are 
very recent, the research field is very young. However, the IDS study suggests some 
emerging evidence of the impact of accountability and transparency initiatives: increased 
state or institutional responsiveness, lowering of corruption, building of new democratic 
spaces for citizen engagement, empowerment of local voices, improved budget utilisation 
and delivery of services (McGee and Gaventa 2011). The study also emphasises the need 
for further research on impact and effectiveness of accountability initiatives; a further IDS 
study (Joshi and Houtzager 2012) highlights also the need for further research on the 
contextual factors within which accountability initiatives can be successful. The present 
research project fits in this second research gap, inasmuch as it aims to analyse one specific 
accountability initiative in the context in which it is implemented and to point out how the 
various contextual factors affect the outcomes of the initiative.  
2.2 Other central issues related to accountability 
 
In the present chapter I have pointed out some specific elements of the complex concept of 
accountability. The discourse and agenda on accountability, being so broad, are linked with 
many other discourses and agendas: governance and democracy, poverty reduction, gender 
equality, civil society empowerment, transparency and corruption, rights-based approaches 
to development, decentralisation and participation, among others (Malena et al 2004). 
                                                 
4 While HELVETAS uses ‘downward accountability’, others use ‘aid accountability’.  
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The discourse on participation is crucial for the framework of this study. Indeed, participation 
is directly linked to social accountability inasmuch as it is what distinguishes social 
accountability from more conventional forms of accountability (Malena et al. 2004). Since the 
1990s with the diffusion of Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques (Chambers 1992; 
Chambers 1994) participation has become a central concept in the development discourse. 
However, the participatory approach has faced fundamental criticisms (Cooke and Kothari 
2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004a; Korf 2010). The participatory approach promoted by 
Chambers and broadly implemented in the development practice was critiqued for presenting 
itself as beyond politics, or as ‘post-political’ (Korf 2010). It is claimed that traditional 
participatory approaches in development projects are applied as if free of political 
involvement. As a consequence, the role of power relations in participatory spaces is mostly 
ignored under the assumption that those spaces are not ‘contaminated’ by politics. The 
criticism of traditional forms of participation emphasises that participatory spaces are a field 
where different actors meet and handle their own interests and that these spaces are 
themselves shaped by relations of power. Consequently, power comes to be a central issue. 
Promoting participation without taking into consideration existing power relationships may 
lead to strengthen those relationships, without bringing a radical social change. Therefore, in 
recent years the concept of ‘transformational’ participation has found large diffusion in 
academic as well as in practitioner discourses (Hickey and Mohan 2004). This concept 
underlines the need for including power analysis in participatory intervention (Gaventa 2004). 
The ‘political economy of participation’ assumes that each intervention (i.e. each new 
participatory space) is inserted in a context of power relations and that, indeed, such new 
spaces represent for actors new means to accumulate political and economic power (Hickey 
and Mohan 2004b). 
These critical points fit in the stream of the deconstructivist critique to development: from the 
approach of radical deconstructivists like Escobar (Escobar 1995) to other more moderate 
approaches like the ones of Long (1992) and Olivier De Sardan (2005), this stream 
challenges the very notion of development, by arguing that the concept itself is nothing but a 
construction, i.e. the result of historical and cultural processes of attribution of meanings 
which are strongly driven by power relations. Thus, the concept of ‘intervention’ comes to 
mean ‘an ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of 
an already-specified plan of action with expected outcomes’ (Long1992:35). Long and Olivier 
De Sardan propose approaches to, respectively, sociology and anthropology of development 
which focus analysis on actors and on their ‘encounters’ in an ‘arena’ – i.e. a ‘political field’ of 
power struggles where values, meanings, resources and relationships are negotiated 
between the actors (Long 1992; Olivier De Sardan 2005). In this framework, development 
intervention is no longer seen as a circumscribed autonomous field, but it is analysed in its 
position within the local arena. In fact, the intervention itself becomes a strategic weapon that 
can be used in the arena to defend one’s own interests in personal power struggles (Long 
1992). 
Therefore, in my analysis I consider the way in which local arenas are shaped by 
development interventions. Participatory interventions create new spaces of participation 
(Cornwall and Coelho 2007a; Cornwall and Coelho 2007b). Following Olivier De Sardan’s 
approach, these spaces should be seen not as autonomous ‘boxes’, but rather as 
occurrences within the unique local arena. These ‘new spaces’ represent a new opportunity 
for a meeting between state and civil society: in the encounter, new boundaries are traced 
between the two entities. The actors themselves are defined and constructed in the 
confrontation with each other (Long 1992:25). Thus, such new spaces become the very 
central point for an analysis of development intervention.  
Cornwall and Coelho (2007a) point out some characteristics of and problems linked to 
spaces of participation. Although in principle everybody is invited to participate, in fact only a 
selected part of the population really does participate. Consequently, issues of inclusion, 
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representativeness and legitimacy arise: who really participates and with what legitimacy to 
represent the broader population? Participation in such spaces, claiming to be open for 
everyone without discrimination, is not regulated by elections. Thus, the legitimacy of 
participants to represent the broader population may be questioned. Researchers often 
highlight the risk of existing elites monopolising participatory spaces and capturing the 
‘development rent’. Olivier De Sardan defines development aid ‘as a “rent” [… that] is based 
on the mobilisation of external resources [i.e. international development funds]’ (Olivier De 
Sardan 2005:173). Although the French anthropologist defines development rent in a strict 
monetary sense, following his further and broader argumentation I prefer to understand the 
rent as a more complex concept, consisting also of non-monetary benefits like reputation, 
prestige, social networks and finally power (Olivier De Sardan 2005:149). 
Often only local elites can actually participate, namely people who are already empowered in 
the community (Olivier De Sardan 2005; Gaventa 2006; Cornwall and Coelho 2007b). By 
controlling the participatory spaces, elites may gain more power and promote their own 
interests; that is, profit from the development rent. Gaventa (2006, 2004) proposes a useful 
differentiation of power forms in the context of participatory development. He distinguishes 
between visible, hidden and invisible power: the less visible the power, the more difficult it is 
to challenge and transform it. Visible power concerns those explicit structures of decision 
making (rules, regulations, acts) that set the formal framework by defining who, how and 
what can decide. In such formal structures there is room for manoeuvre for exercising hidden 
power in setting the agenda and deciding which issues should be discussed and which 
should not. Even more subtly, invisible power is rooted more strongly in the cultural and 
social context: it concerns the construction of meanings, values, representations and how 
people think about the world in which they are living. Invisible power can lead to intimidation 
and self-censorship. Thus, in order both to avoid reproducing existing harmful power 
relations and to strengthen positive power occurrences, it is crucial to analyse in depth all 
kinds of power relations. 
Furthermore, since new participatory spaces are constructed as all social spaces are, it is 
important to analyse how the boundaries of such spaces are shaped and by whom: ‘who is 
inviting participation and who is taking part, and what they think participation is about or for’ 
(Cornwall 2002:10). Gaventa (2006, 2004; Gaventa and Cornwall 2002) suggests a 
differentiation based on who creates the spaces and to whom they are open. He 
distinguishes between closed, invited and claimed spaces: the first are created by power 
holders and closed to the broader population; the second are created by ‘various kind of 
authorities’ that invite the broader population freely to participate; the third are created from 
active bottom up mobilisation and requests by ‘less powerful actors’ (Gaventa 2006:26-27). 
2.3 About fragility 
 
Like accountability, ‘fragility’ is a word that is broadly used in academic and practitioner works 
but whose definition is everything but univocal (Grävingholt et al. 2012). Indeed, fragility is 
mostly interpreted as both a cause and a consequence of violent conflicts, in a process in 
which the former strengthens the latter and vice versa (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009). Many 
attempts have been made to find meaningful indicators and a way of measuring fragility, but 
the concept is so broad and complex that all indicators can describe just a small part of the 
phenomenon (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009).  
In the new millennium, fragility has become a central issue within the international 
cooperation world and agencies have been questioning firstly what fragility means and 
secondly what the role of development agencies can be in a fragile context. Consequently, 
each agency developed its own definition of fragility (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009). 
HELVETAS’s definition of fragility is the following:   
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Weak institutional capacity and lack of accountability as well as legitimacy and 
missing monopoly of force by the state increase the risk of violence. Under such 
circumstances, governments are often seen as perpetrators or absent actors, making 
way for greed or grievances from various population groups and elites in the society. 
In the long run, these grievances add to the risk of political instability and violent 
conflict.  
(Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009; OECD 2007) 
Although there is no agreement about the exact definition and measurement of fragility, 
academic researchers and practitioners agree on its multidimensionality. Basically, beyond 
differences in terminology and detailed definitions, fragility is characterised by three 
dimensions (Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009:6): 
 
• Effectiveness (or capacity) refers to the capacity of the state to deliver basic 
services and guarantee economic and social welfare to its citizens. This capacity 
depends heavily on the economic situation of the country. Part of this dimension is 
also the matter of social inclusion: ethnicity, caste, gender and other kinds of 
discrimination in service delivery and in welfare distribution are factors that can 
lead to instability and can therefore be used as indicators of fragility.  
• Authority refers to the ability of the state to enforce its monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force and to ensure security. Consequently, both violent conflicts and high 
criminality rates can be read as signs of fragility.  
• Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the state by its people in a non-coerced 
way and the capacity of the state to effectively represent its citizens. 
 
Nepal is taken to be a ‘fragile country’ in the present study and, indeed, it is an often-cited 
example of ‘fragility’ (Stewart and Brown 2009; DFID 2010). The main and more obvious 
reason to define Nepal as a fragile context has been the civil war started by the Maoists in 
1996. They demanded, among other things, the secularisation of the Hindu-based state and 
the abolition of the monarchy, which had been ruling the country since unification in 1769 
(Whelpton 2005). In 2006 the second People's Movement, which saw a temporary coalition 
of the main parties and Maoist rebels, led to the signing of a Peace Agreement, which finally 
ended the civil war, restoring the Prime Minister and the Parliament and proclaiming Nepal 
as a secular country. After the Peace Agreement a Constituent Assembly was elected in 
2008, whose first act was the declaration of Nepal as a Federal Democratic Republic 
(Srivastava and Sharma 2010). However, since 2006 Nepal has still been considered a 
fragile country: the main characteristic of its fragility, now, lies in the situation of transition and 
in the difficult state-building process which has not yet been able to provide the country with 
a stable form of government and a stable state structure (Stewart and Brown 2009; DFID 
2010). The Constituent Assembly elected in 2008 failed to accomplish its duty: after four 
years of shifting deadlines for the draft of the new constitution, on 27 May 2012 the Assembly 
was dissolved, thereby leaving the country in a situation of high uncertainty (Parajuli 2012). 
Thus, Nepal is now facing important challenges in all three fragility dimensions defined 
above.  
First, the effectiveness of state service delivery is still low: Nepal ranks below the 100th place 
in the classification of 192 countries according to GDP and a quarter of Nepalis still live under 
the national poverty line, although the percentage has rapidly decreased in the last decade. 
National development strongly depends on foreign aid and the ratio of total debt to GDP is 
more than 20 per cent. Moreover, economic and social exclusion and discrimination based 
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on caste, ethnicity and gender are very prominent5. While the poverty rate has decreased, 
the Gini Index measuring the inequality in income distribution has increased (World Bank 
2012). 
Second, regarding authority, violence in the country has decreased markedly after 2006 and 
occurrences of extreme violence have become less frequent. However, massive 
demonstrations, strikes, bandhs (general strikes) and other popular forms of protest very 
often set the country in a situation of blockage and chaos and generate a sense of instability 
and insecurity. The justice system is not effective: processes are lengthy and often delayed; 
and impunity both for the crimes committed during the conflict and for more recent crimes of 
corruption is widespread, undermining the trust of people in the justice system (Amnesty 
International 2012). 
Third, legitimacy is today the most challenging issue in the ‘fragility’ of Nepal. Nepalis have 
learned from history not to trust people who are in power (Whelpton 2005; Srivastava and 
Sharma 2010). Before the advent of democracy, continuous power struggles led the two 
main dynasties ruling the Kingdom to open and violent confrontations as well as to more sly 
machinations and opportunistic alliances with powerful neighbours (China and India with its 
British coloniser). The ten years of democratic experiment in the 1950s, when the first 
political parties were founded and the King shared the power with the Parliament, were 
characterised by inter- and intraparty conflicts, ever-changing alliances and fragmentations, 
and were ended by the royal takeover in 1960 with the consequent ban of political parties. 
The same pattern was reproduced thirty years later, after three decades of the royal-imposed 
party-less panchayat system, a system of directly and indirectly elected representatives that 
had little room for manoeuvre under the power of the King. The Panchayat banned political 
parties and strongly repressed democratic movements, in particular at the end of the 1970s. 
The democratic achievements of the first People’s Movement in the 1990s were again 
dismantled by the royal takeover in 2005. The decade following this second democratic 
experiment was characterised by frequent government changes, driven by individual greed 
and power struggles and resulting in the incapacity to build a legitimate government. This 
was also one reason (and at the same time a consequence) of the Maoist insurgency at the 
turn of the century. Thus, popular expectations and hopes of democracy were miserably 
disappointed over the years, prejudicing the confidence of citizens in state institutions. 
Today, the long (and lengthened) process to the new constitution and the continuous 
conflicts between and within parties do not help Nepalis to find reasons to trust people in 
power. 
Definitions and descriptions of fragility are very often focused on macro phenomena. The 
same focus was set in the preceding paragraphs, which described the macro characteristics 
that still make of Nepal a fragile country and for which Nepal has been chosen for this study. 
However, we are interested in observing the particularities of fragility at the local level, 
especially its effects on accountability. We want to analyse which elements of fragility can be 
found by looking at the micro level, and what are the ‘micro consequences’ of ‘macro 
fragility’. 
                                                 
5 Such differentiations are exacerbated by the very high diversity characterising the country: beside the traditional Hinduistic 
differentiation in castes, Nepal counts an important number of ethnic groups, most of which have a very strong cultural tradition 
and after 2006 are fighting for the recognition of their autonomy (Pradhan 2002). 
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3 Context  
3.1 Governance structure in Nepal 
The current local governance structure was defined in 1990, when the whole organisation of 
the country was reviewed after thirty years of the party-less panchayat system and the first 
local elections took place. The new structure was fixed in the 1999 Local Self-Governance 
Act or LGSA (GoN 1999a) and 1999 Local Self-Governance Regulation (GoN 1999b), which 
mandate the devolution of powers from the central government to the local authorities and 
define the rights and responsibilities of the various bodies at the different levels (see Annex 
II). 
As a consequence of the LSGA, in the last decade resources were increasingly channelled to 
the local bodies. Thus, local bodies face a big challenge: suddenly they have at their disposal 
far more resources than before, but staff, capacities and knowledge have not increased 
proportionally. The consequence is low efficiency (and effectiveness) in the allocation of 
resources. Moreover, these settings create a very high risk of corruption: the resources are 
many, but the mechanisms to allocate them and control their allocation are still not well 
developed. 
In 2002 the local elected representatives were dismissed by the central government and 
replaced by centrally appointed officials: during the following four years political parties did 
not have formal power at local level. In 2006 the All-Party Mechanism (APM) was introduced: 
the executive bodies were formed of unelected people’s representatives directly appointed by 
the parties (one representative for each party active in the area) (Acharya 2011). At the 
beginning of 2012 the APM was dismantled by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse 
of Authority (CIAA): the decision was motivated by the high risk of corruption (Kathmandu 
Metro 2012). As a consequence, the entire (formal) power structure was shifted to the 
bureaucracy, i.e. to centrally appointed officials, technicians and bureaucrats. Today the 
(formally) most powerful figures in the local administration are the Local Development Officer 
(LDO) at DDC level and the Village Development Committee (VDC) Secretary at village level. 
Thus, at the time of writing, again, political parties have no formal power at local level. 
However, political leaders still have varying levels of influence in the planning and execution 
processes at VDC and District Development Committee (DDC) level.  
Although the LSGA sets the steps for a decentralisation process, local bodies are still under 
the strict control of the central government. Moreover, the LSGA itself does not speak of local 
government but only of local bodies or authorities: the real autonomy of these institutions has 
still to be recognised and is a main issue in the discussion regarding the new constitution. 
The critical situation of these local bodies has been recognised by the central government, 
which (together with international donors) launched in 2008 the very ambitious Local 
Governance and Community Development Programme (GoN 2008). The programme aims at 
strengthening the local level both on the side of local bodies and of citizens. Local bodies 
should be supported by developing and increasing their capacities and citizens should be 
empowered for active engagement in decision making at the local level. A main component 
of the programme is the concept of ‘transformational social mobilisation’ in opposition to 
‘transactional social mobilisation’ (GoN 2009). With a transactional approach (GoN 2009), 
social mobilisation does not aim at challenging existing power structures from the ground up 
but aims at mobilising the community in order to make more effective the allocation of 
resources or the service delivery. In contrast, in the transformational approach applied by the 
LGCDP (GoN 2009), social mobilisation aims at transforming the existing power structures 
by empowering marginalised groups, thereby giving them the chance to actively participate to 
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the decision-making process. The programme represents an important step in the process of 
building strong, stable and accountable local institutions.  
3.2 HELVETAS work in the country 
3.2.1 The Public Audit Practice 
 
In the 1950s the government of Nepal started to open the country to international aid and 
cooperation. Nowadays the development scenario in Nepal is characterised by a multitude of 
international organisations engaging in the country. In 2010 international aid flows to Nepal 
represented more than 5 per cent of the gross national income, at more than 800 million US 
dollars (OECD 2012). The engagement of HELVETAS in the country, which started in the 
mid-1950s, has undergone many changes, reflecting both the changes in the national context 
and in international approaches to development (HELVETAS Nepal 2006a). At the beginning, 
the organisation was working almost entirely with the central government. In the following 
years the focus of not only HELVETAS, but development agencies overall, shifted 
increasingly to the local population and civil society. Since the 1980s HELVETAS’ attention 
has shifted to local bodies as very important actors in local development: a new range of 
interventions was then focused on supporting local bodies to fulfil their tasks (e.g. support of 
participatory planning practices). During the insurgency Maoists challenged the position of 
local authorities: working with local bodies in areas controlled by Maoists was risky and even 
life threatening for development workers. Thus, matters of downward accountability and aid 
transparency became crucial in order to guarantee the continuation of the engagement. Most 
agencies developed stricter governance and transparency guidelines and downward 
accountability tools (Singh and Ingdal 2007). It was also during that time, precisely in 2004, 
that the Public Audit Practice found its general application in HELVETAS’ interventions in the 
whole country. The history of HELVETAS’ Public Audit Practice in Nepal (HELVETAS Nepal 
2004) began in the 1980s with the first attempts and experimentation with public gatherings 
at community level. The practice was consolidated during the 1990s in the two biggest 
infrastructure projects (water management and trail bridges) and subsequently applied in all 
projects. Nowadays, HELVETAS Nepal has a specific working area (Governance and Peace) 
working with crosscutting issues of governance (i.e. participation, transparency, 
accountability, etc.), which is responsible for the overall implementation of the PAP. The 
originality and effectiveness of HELVETAS’ PAP were recently recognised with the ALINe 
award.6 
Basically, PAP is a tool for improving the downward accountability of the agency. PAP 
consists of three steps: Public Hearing (PH), Public Review (PR) and Public Audit (PA), 
during which information about the project is shared and decisions are taken with the 
beneficiaries (for a detailed description see Annex III). Depending on distinctive features of 
the different projects, the three gatherings can be organised and facilitated by HELVETAS 
local staff, by the local service provider (LSP) or by the user committee. In principle, all 
stakeholders are invited to participate (and the participation of some of them is compulsory): 
HELVETAS staff, LSP, user committee, beneficiaries, local government officials, political 
parties representatives, media and of course the whole community benefitting.  
The first reason for conducting a PAP is the enhancement of aid transparency and 
accountability (see McGee and Gaventa 2011) and in general of downward accountability. It 
should enhance credibility as well as the legitimacy and acceptance of the project by the 
community. This is the second reason behind PAP: to involve the community at every step of 
every project and to provide stakeholders with a space to express their opinions, criticism 
and suggestions. As a third motivation, HELVETAS’ PAP issue sheet states that ‘… the 
actual goal is to sensitise beneficiaries and build democratic practices from the bottom. 
                                                 
6 See www.aline.org.uk/whatwedo/researchandevaluation/alinefarmervoiceawards (accessed 24.07.12). 
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People are empowered to demand accountability’ (HELVETAS Switzerland, n.d.a). 
Moreover, ‘[t]he PAP raises awareness among the people on their right to information and on 
the duty of the power-holders to be accountable to them. People are empowered to claim 
transparency and accountability from other donors / INGOs as well as from the government’ 
(HELVETAS Switzerland, n.d.a). This third reason represents a secondary (and mostly 
indirect) output of the PAP and is the focus of our research. Of course, PAP aims also at 
development effectiveness objectives, but only in an indirect and secondary way (see McGee 
and Gaventa 2011).  
3.2.2 The Trail Bridge Support Unit 
 
Nepal's amazing landscape, with its high mountains and steep valleys, but also with its 
flatland in the South divided by numerous big rivers, represents a challenge for the 
development of transport and of the country’s economy. The road network has developed in 
recent decades, but most of Nepal is still cut off from the transport circuit and is very difficult 
to access. Trail bridges are an effective tool to improve the connection of remote regions to 
the transport network: nearly 4,500 trail bridges are already present on the territory, but 
further potential demand for an additional 6,000 bridges is estimated (HELVETAS Nepal 
2010).  
At the beginning of its engagement in trail bridge construction in Nepal in the early 1960s, 
HELVETAS was working directly with communities without involving the central government, 
which had its own centralised bridge building programme (HELVETAS Nepal 2006b; see also 
Annex IV for a detailed description of today’s trail bridge construction process). In the early 
1990s the central government started to decentralise smaller tasks on the district level. 
However, it was in the mid-1990s that the decentralising strategy gained more importance 
with responsibility for building competencies shifting to the local level. Since 2009, the 
construction of trail bridges in the whole country is managed by the Department of Local 
Infrastructure Development and Agriculture Roads (DoLIDAR) of the Government of Nepal 
through a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp): the trail bridge section (now Local Bridge Section) 
of DoLIDAR coordinates and monitors the whole bridge construction programme in Nepal. 
Aid funds from donors (including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC) 
for trail bridges are channelled into the specific basket managed by the Department and are 
then handled as state resources. The aim of using a Sector Wide Approach is to harmonise 
the landscape of trail bridge construction, which was (and is) populated by many donors and 
organisations and which should be coordinated with broader governmental infrastructure 
plans. The Trail Bridge Support Unit (TBSU), HELVETAS’s section responsible for 
implementing SDC’s programme for trail bridge construction in Nepal, supports the 
governmental sector with technical assistance (quality assurance and capacity building of 
stakeholders among others). The guidelines for PAP implementation were integrated in the 
new governmental sector: PAP is now implemented for every trail bridge built in the country. 
Hence, besides being a downward accountability tool for HELVETAS Nepal, in the case of 
trail bridges PAP has come to be at the same time a social accountability tool that demands 
that local authorities (DDC, rather than VDC) account for the proper use and effectiveness of 
public resources and a public accountability tool for local authorities to implement 
transparency on public resources use. Thus, TBSU’s PAP becomes of particular interest for 
this study, inasmuch as, contrarily to other HELVETAS projects implementing PAP, it 
represents a form of public transparency and accountability initiative activated by social 
accountability efforts, rather than only a form of downward accountability by an aid agency to 
its beneficiary or target populations.  
 20 
4 Conceptual framework and research 
questions 
For the reasons already stated in the Introduction and Conceptual background, the leading 
research question for this study is: which practices and factors contribute to the success of 
accountability initiatives in fragile contexts? As already mentioned, this project fits in the 
research gap pointed out by Joshi and Houtzager (2012) on the contextual factors that affect 
the outcomes of accountability initiatives.7 It is important to emphasise once again that this 
study does not aim to assess the success of such initiatives, but to analyse the contextual 
factors that influence the implementation of such initiatives.  
More specifically, the focus lies on the relationship between the state and its citizens and on 
the specific accountability mechanisms activated on both supply side and demand side of 
that relationship. The aim is to understand under what local circumstances or conditions local 
authorities are willing to be accountable to citizens in challenging environments and under 
what conditions interventions succeed at improving the accountability of local government 
towards their citizens in those particular cases. Particular attention is paid to the role citizens 
play in demanding or promoting accountability and on the obstacles they face to exercise 
voice. We8 are also interested in ascertaining what conditions seem to be generally 
conducive across all cases, although we are aware of the limited generalisation potential of 
the qualitative case study approach chosen for the research project (see next chapter, 
Methodology).  
We first developed leading working definitions for accountability and social accountability 
according to the sketched conceptual background. Thus, accountability is the obligation of 
power holders to take responsibility and to be answerable and liable with regard to their 
actions and choices. Social accountability is an approach towards building accountability that 
relies on civic engagement, in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organisations 
participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Mechanisms of social 
accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens, or both, but often are 
demand driven and operate from the bottom up. I assumed that accountability shapes state–
citizens relations through various mechanisms and I identified some core issues as part of 
accountability practices. Each of these can be seen at the same time from the supply side 
and from the demand side of the relation: 
 
• Voice. How people exercise their voice; how the state listens to that voice and is 
answerable to it. 
• Information. How people ask for information; what kind of transparency is provided 
by the state and how the state is answerable to the requests of the people. 
• Decision-making. How people participate to the decision-making process; how 
choices regarding its citizens are taken by the state. 
• Service delivery. How people monitor the actions of the state; how the state gives 
people the means to monitor its actions.  
                                                 
7 For some literature specifically about accountability in Nepal see e.g. Hamal & Sigdel (2012), The Carter Center (2011) and 
Jha et al. (2009); Tamang and Malena (2011) provide a broad overview of contextual factors influencing social accountability in 
Nepal and represent thus an important basis for the further observations. 
8 I use the plural form whenever I refer to the research team of the overall study or to the country team for Nepal; the teams’ 
composition and responsibilities are described in the next chapter. I use the singular form whenever I refer to myself as the 
person who assumes the responsibility for a part of the research design, for data analysis and for writing the present report.   
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• Incentives/sanctions. What incentives and sanctions are provided to people to 
participate; what sanction mechanisms are available if state accountability fails, 
and what incentives are provided to promote accountability.  
I assumed a fundamental distinction between legal and institutional settings on one hand (i.e. 
what is stated on paper) and the practical implementation of such settings on the other one 
(i.e. what is really happening). The study also pays attention to the way in which different 
accountability forms and initiatives are interacting and thereby strengthening (or hampering) 
each other and what kind of innovative or informal mechanisms can be observed.  
For the analysis I assumed a post-structuralist and social constructivist attitude and drew on 
the actor-oriented approaches suggested by Long (1992) and Olivier De Sardan (2005). 
Although the analysis does not completely adhere to the procedures proposed by the two 
authors, I followed them by looking at the behaviour of the various actors, asking what 
interests, motivations, constraints, struggles and strategies shape their decisions. The actors, 
of course, are observed in their social context, namely in their behaviour within the local 
social arena. While looking at the arena, the main questions are about power, i.e. what kind 
of power is mobilised by the different actors, why and with which consequences. I also 
analysed how actors construct, through negotiation, themselves and the sense of the 
different issues handled in the arena. Finally, in the whole analysis I paid particular attention 
to the context in which actors are included, thereby observing at the same time how the 
context influences the behaviour of actors and how the latter shapes the former.  
We focused our field research on one specific intervention promoting accountability (the 
Public Audit Practice) within one specific project of HELVETAS Nepal (the Trail Bridge 
Support Unit). As showed in the previous chapter, the PAP is originally a tool of downward 
accountability, i.e. of accountability from HELVETAS towards its beneficiaries. However, the 
framework of TBSU’s PAP fits the research objectives very well inasmuch as it involves 
various kinds of actors: from the state (at all levels), from the civil society (user committee, 
beneficiaries, local service provider a local NGO, HELVETAS an INGO9) and from the private 
sector (‘fabricators’10). All these actors are invited to participate in a new participatory space 
created expressly for the project. Since the state is a main actor in the trail bridge 
construction, TBSU’s PAP is a tool not only for HELVETAS’ downward accountability, but 
also for public accountability of the state (mostly local authorities) towards its citizens. 
Moreover, the PAP embodies the characteristics of social accountability tools described 
above, since it relies on the mobilisation of civil society actors in order to monitor the 
behaviour of state actors and (I)NGOs. Also practical reasons led to the decision to focus on 
this specific project. The TBSU is the largest project of HELVETAS in Nepal and the only one 
that allowed us to attend the three steps of PAP (PH, PR and PA) in only three months of 
field research. Moreover, the TBSU is one of the projects with the longest experience in the 
implementation of PAP.  
We therefore chose TBSU’s PAP as a privileged field where the behaviour and the 
interaction of actors can be observed and analysed. By looking at the specific space created 
through the intervention, we aimed to identify and understand the strategies that motivate the 
behaviour of the various actors, as well as the contextual variables that facilitate or obstruct 
the success of the specific accountability initiative. Beside the general questions listed above, 
I also observed the participatory space of the intervention relying on the framework proposed 
by Gaventa (2006) and Cornwall and Coelho (2007) sketched above, and asking in what way 
that space is constructed and how the various actors shape that space. Moreover, particular 
                                                 
9 In this report I refer to (I)NGOs as civil society actors, but I am aware that they present many characteristics of private sector 
actors (see also The role of CBOs and NGOs in the Findings).   
10 ‘Fabricator’, though not common in British English,is the term used in the framework of TBSU to designate the (private) 
supplier of specific technical material that cannot be found/produced within the community.  
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attention is paid to the different forms of power (visible, hidden, and invisible) and how they 
shape the space and the behaviour of actors.  
5 Methodology 
5.1 Methodological approach 
 
A qualitative, inductive, case study approach has been chosen for the research project. The 
study of course relies on the existing literature, but, since the field we want to explore is very 
young, we do not formulate hypothesis in advance that should be demonstrated with the 
research nor do we aim at an impact assessment or at the measuring of the degree of 
correlation between different factors. Rather, the observation is open to new and unexpected 
correlations and connections, which is possible through inductive and qualitative research 
(Kruker Meier and Rauh 2005). The approach for the Nepali case study is fundamentally 
based on post-structuralist and social constructivist theories: it is assumed that reality is 
socially constructed through routine and social interaction and is shaped by power relations 
(Kruker Meier and Rauh 2005).  
However, the research project also has a more practice-oriented objective, i.e. to understand 
the context and the implementation of HELVETAS interventions in a way that is helpful for 
future practice. Hence, the study is also applied research, which requires a certain degree of 
generalisation of the findings. Although we are not looking for statistically representative data 
and although we are aware of the limited generalising potential of qualitative case study 
research, we try to consider whether some findings might be generalised beyond the case 
study. This should be possible also with the comparison of the three case studies in the three 
selected countries. However, this is not a comparative study in a strict sense: no common 
specific research design has been established, but each team adapted the design and the 
focus to the peculiarities of each specific context.  
In a purely qualitative approach, quality, objectivity and reliability of data can be guaranteed 
through different methods, among which triangulation is one of the most used (Kruker Meier 
and Rauh 2005; Mikkelsen 2005). Data were triangulated in different ways (see Mikkelsen 
2005:196-7). First, different collection methods were used, by integrating more traditional 
interviews with participatory tools and participatory observation. Second, we differentiated 
our sample and collected the data in different locations and in different moments of the trail 
bridge construction process (data triangulation). Third, the composition of the Nepali 
research team (see below) allowed a very broad investigator triangulation, with constant 
exchanges between the three members, each of whom had a very different background. 
Moreover, a communicative validation was applied (Mikkelsen 2005), mostly with HELVETAS 
staff and local NGOs, by discussing impressions and analysis with them during expert 
interviews, informal conversations and feedback meetings.  
A sensible choice of the sample is also a way to guarantee validity and reliability of data: 
moreover, the capacity of data to cover the broadest range of correlations and phenomena 
and to represent (in the sense of representation and not of representativeness) the 
investigated reality depends on the sample (Kruker Meier and Rauh 2005; Mikkelsen 2005). 
We used a partially structured and stratified sampling, but we left space in the field for 
random sampling and chain sampling. The structuring of the sampling was based on the role 
of actors as regards the trail bridge project: the actors were divided in two categories, namely 
the actively involved actors and the not actively involved actors. The first are actors who have 
an active role and active responsibilities in the trail bridge construction: DDC and VDC 
officers, TBSU, LSP, user committee and to some extent political parties. The second are 
people who are touched by the project to the extent that they are beneficiaries of the trail 
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bridge, but who are not actively involved in the organisation of the project (except for the 
practical community work at the bridge site): these are villagers of all kinds, local NGOs or 
CBOs working in other projects, media, political parties. Especially in the category ‘villagers’, 
it was important to consider the stratification of the sample, which was based on traditional 
variables of caste/ethnicity, gender, economic status, education, age, profession, 
geographical location within the village. Although no systematic stratification was applied, we 
tried to cover the broadest range of different variables in the interviews and interactions in the 
field.  
5.2 Research process and implementation of methodological tools 
 
This study was initiated by the HELVETAS Head office with the involvement of a senior 
researcher of the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Sussex for academic 
support. The team for Nepal was comprised of the Programme Coordinator for the 
Governance and Peace working area of HELVETAS Nepal, a Nepali student (Kathmandu 
University) and myself as young Swiss researcher (University of Zurich). Each of the three 
members brought into the team his/her own perspective, which diversity made the strength of 
the team. The Programme Coordinator brought his long experience as practitioner in the 
development field in the country; the Nepali student brought the academic perspective from 
inside the country and the Swiss student the academic perspective from outside the 
continent. The composition of the research team of course influenced the research 
implementation, in particular the interaction with the actors. The Programme Coordinator’s 
involvement in the research project and his presence at some interviews and meetings might 
have created different reactions from the interlocutors regarding his position in three ways. 
First, a sense of subjection by a person holding an important position in an important 
development agency could have led the interlocutors to ‘adorn’ their answers in order to 
show him the quality of their work. Second, the presence of an important person of an 
agency could have created expectations about future projects or funding by that agency. 
Third, the presence of the Programme Coordinator with his inside experience allowed 
interviewees to introduce more complex and ‘insider’ issues, which were introduced less 
often while speaking only with external people (i.e. the two students). On the other hand, the 
young age and the female gender of the two students had an ‘easing’ effect on the 
interviewees. We did not feel either age or gender discrimination in the interaction with our 
interlocutors. Nevertheless, the socio-economic provenance of the two students (high caste, 
urban, one educated and the other from a highly developed country) created in some cases a 
sense of envy in the interlocutors in the villages. More generally, beyond the individuality of 
the researchers, the framework of the study itself had an influence on the interlocutors and 
their answers. Although we repeatedly explained that our aim was not an impact assessment 
or an evaluation of the project or the project’s collaborators, we felt that our interlocutors still 
perceived it as an evaluation of their work. Therefore, their answers were sometime biased 
and ‘built’ to present their work in a beautified way. We also felt sometimes a ‘defensive’ 
reaction from our interlocutors to observations from our side that pointed out problematic 
issues.  
The actual implementation of the research started with a first phase of primary and 
secondary literature review, conducted by the author of this report in Zurich. After that, three 
months of field research in Nepal, between February and April 2012, represented the main 
data collection phase. Part of the time was spent at HELVETAS central office in Patan, a 
town close to the capital Kathmandu. During the first days in Patan the team could meet the 
TBSU staff, in order to include its preferences and needs in the research design as well as to 
organise the actual field work in the bridge locations.  
The data collection in Nepal happened on two different levels. On the one hand the team 
conducted expert interviews (Kruker Meier and Rauh 2005) in Patan and in Surkhet District 
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capital with HELVETAS staff and with collaborators of other agencies dealing with 
accountability issues in Nepal. The aim of the interviews with HELVETAS staff was to explore 
their experience with PAP applied to projects different than TBSU. We met other agencies, 
as well, in order to collect ideas and experiences about other ways of dealing with 
accountability questions in the country. The approach to the meetings with experts, both 
inside and outside HELVETAS, is the semi-structured and semi-standardised interview with a 
high degree of freedom for the interviewee to bring into the discussion new issues and also 
for the interviewer to follow and deepen the ways showed by the interviewee. By creating the 
environment of a less formal and less structured interview we aimed at exploring in the 
broadest way possible the experience of the interviewees (Kruker Meier and Rauh 2005). All 
expert interviews were held in English and without recording. The composition of the 
interviewers’ team varied from one to three persons, with my presence as constant in all 
interviews.  We conducted over ten expert interviews, in addition to some meetings with 
TBSU staff.  
On the other hand the team visited three bridge locations in order to gain local firsthand 
knowledge. The criterion for the selection of the villages was merely pragmatic: they were 
selected in order to allow the team to attend one public hearing, one public review and one 
public audit. The access to the field was organised by the Programme Coordinator and 
guaranteed by the contact with local TBSU staff and LSP (see Annex I). 
For the actual research on the field, we conducted first of all participant observation 
(Silverman 2010), which was not limited to the observation of the public meetings of the PAP, 
but was applied also to other kinds of public meetings (i.e. CBOs’ meetings), to a 
Demonstration Model Bridge Training (the workshop where user committee members from 
various bridge sites are taught about the technicalities of the bridge building as well as about 
health and governance issues) and to the everyday life in the village in general. Living with 
villagers allowed us to share with the families and with local people their everyday life and to 
observe the everyday relationships, power structures, habits and struggles taking place in the 
village. The aim of observing the public meetings as part of the PAP was first of all to analyse 
the implementation of such practices in the concrete praxis: we focused our attention on the 
kind of topics discussed in the meetings as well as on the group dynamics taking place in 
such occasions. The same focus was set while observing meetings of other CBOs during 
which we also tried to identify what other kind of accountability mechanisms were being 
implemented. We attended about ten such meetings, taking advantage of the occasion also 
to informally interact with the members.  
The main ‘active’ method used during the field research was the semi-structured and semi-
standardised interview (Mikkelsen 2005; Silverman 2010). We developed two different 
checklists for the interviews. The first used for actors actively involved in the project (see 
above) was focused on the specific role of the interviewee in the bridge construction and 
his/her interaction with other actors. The second checklist was used for actors not actively 
involved in the project (see above) and was focused on the knowledge of the interviewee 
about the trail bridge project as well as on his/her broader relation with, and perception of, 
the state (i.e. the local authorities). The interviews were held mostly individually, but we used 
roughly the same checklists for group interviews (Mikkelsen 2005). The first type of checklist 
was followed more strictly during the interviews. With the second type of checklist we let the 
interviews develop more freely, allowing interviewees to deviate more strongly from the main 
topics. This allowed us to be very open to new issues and themes that represent a priority for 
local people. In total we held over fifty formal interviews (first and second checklist type) in 
the field, in which user committee members were the most represented, five group 
discussions with the community (second checklist type) and about thirty less formal 
interviews with residents (second checklist type). 
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In order to explore the field and later to complete the information gathered during the 
interviews, we used also Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools (Mikkelsen 2005). 
Specifically, we conducted five actor mappings and social mappings of the project and of the 
community. These tools were used exclusively with people actively involved in the project 
(LSP and TBSU staff, user committee members). With these tools we gained an overview 
about the social and spatial organisation of the project as well as of the community. In 
particular, actor mappings allowed us not only to identify the actors we would later interview, 
but also to obtain information about their relationships and their mutual perception and 
representation. Timelines, life stories as well as long and frequent informal conversational 
interviews were also used to deepen our knowledge about the community and the project 
and were employed mostly with key informants.  
Of course, in the villages as well as in Kathmandu/Patan, a large amount of data was 
produced through informal interaction. Every conversation or encounter or experience we 
had could bring us important material for our analysis.   
In the field only a few interviews and conversations were held in English. The rest were 
translated by the Nepali student from English to Nepali and vice versa. Most formal 
interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees. We had the feeling that this 
did not disturb the interviewees: as soon as we felt some discomfort we left the recorder 
aside. The translation process of course influenced the natural flow of the conversations, but 
at the same time gave time to both the interviewer and the interviewee to think about what it 
was being said and about the unfolding of the conversation.  
In the last days in Patan before my departure, the team presented its first impressions and 
observations from the field trips in two meetings with TBSU staff and HELVETAS staff from 
other projects. The aim of the meetings was twofold: on the one hand, to share the first 
findings and a first tentative to formulate some recommendations for HELVETAS Nepal’s 
practical work; on the other hand, to get feedback about the fresh observations.   
After the end of the three months in Nepal, I assumed the responsibility for the data analysis 
and for the writing of this report. The Nepali team colleagues participated in the last phase by 
filling contextual knowledge and memory gaps. For the data analysis I used an open coding 
procedure, in order to be as open as possible to new issues and surprises from the data 
(Mikkelsen 2005). At the same time though, I also went through the data with the structure of 
some previously defined categories, for instance the categories of accountability elements 
presented in the previous chapters. The first draft of this report was sent to the Nepali team 
members, to TBSU staff and to other HELVETAS Nepal staff in order to review it and to give 
feedback and suggestions for improvement. The second draft of the report with the 
integrated feedback from Nepal was reviewed by HELVETAS Head office and by the IDS 
senior researcher. This final report will be shared with HELVETAS Nepal staff and with other 
(governmental and non-governmental) agencies working in the field. The three reports from 
Nepal, Mozambique and Bangladesh will be synthesised and published in a final synthesis 
report written by HELVETAS Head office jointly with IDS. 
6 Findings 
In this section I analyse the roles of the different actors actively and passively involved in the 
trail bridge project and of other actors in the project context. First I present the local 
authorities and the political parties and locate their accountability practices in the broader 
context beyond the project. This should help build an understanding of the context and 
accountability (or non-accountability) traditions in which the specific project is inserted. 
Second, with a similar aim, I sketch the scenario of NGOs’ and CBOs’ work in Nepal and 
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their role in promoting accountability and democratic practices, empowering community 
people, but also, in some cases, strengthening existing power relations. In the third section of 
the chapter I narrow my focus to the specific context of the trail bridge project and, in 
particular, the user committee. I analyse the accountability practices put in place by the 
committee and the shaping of its formal and factual boundaries in relation to power structures 
and participation. In the following section I discuss the Public Audit Practice, presenting the 
incentives and disincentives for different actors to participate in the meetings and the 
symbolic potential of the meetings. The last section of this chapter zooms out again to the 
broader implementation of Public Audit Practice in contexts different than the trail bridge 
project.  
6.1 Local authorities and political parties 
 
Local authorities (i.e. VDC and DDC officials) and local political party representatives are the 
local political power holders: they administer public resources at local level and have decision 
making power about their use. The kind of accountability linked to this kind of power is public 
accountability: in order to be accountable to the broader population these actors have to 
justify their decisions in respect of the use of public resources.  
The main public accountability tool elsewhere is elections (see Conceptual background). A 
characteristic of local political and institutional organisation in Nepal is the lack of elected 
local representatives since 2002 (see Context): formal power at local level is currently in the 
hands of centrally appointed officials. However, in fact, power is still shared between 
bureaucracy and party political actors: political parties still play a central role at local level. 
When asked about the changes after the dissolution of the all-party mechanism (APM, see 
Context), people mostly said that there was no change. The formal local authority still needs 
to consult political parties over every decision, for two reasons: firstly, because political 
parties still have considerable influence in the community and it would be difficult for officials 
to implement any decision without their support; and secondly, officials often cannot afford 
the burden of taking all decisions alone. In general, human and administrative resources are 
lacking or scarce; to take decisions, officials need the help of parties in the form of local and 
contextual knowledge about the community offered by local politicians.  
6.1.1 Local authorities: horizontal and vertical accountability 
 
Although internal mechanisms of control (horizontal accountability) are partially provided for 
on paper, the control over local bureaucrats is lacking in effectiveness. Rent seeking and 
corruption are central issues in Nepal and are a widespread reality, although anticorruption 
initiatives increased after the first People’s Movement in the 1990s and even more after the 
Peace Agreement in 2006. Corruption is so common that it is accepted as a natural 
phenomenon and in some cases corrupt behaviour is even seen as a positive quality. At the 
upper level, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) represents a 
new tool for preventing corruption, but the cases that reach the central level are few in 
contrast to the widespread diffusion of corruption at all levels in the country. Because of a 
lack of personnel in the CIAA, civil servants have been representing the CIAA, thereby 
making action against civil servants involved in corruption and misconduct less effective.  
Moreover, the system of formal and factual sanctions in cases of misconduct lacks 
effectiveness and transparency. We observed two different patterns in the career of officials, 
at all levels. The first pattern applies to officials appointed by the central government and 
thereafter holding their positions for a long time without fearing sanctions in case of 
misconduct. On the one hand the long duration of officials’ positions can increase the 
efficiency of their work, in that long experience of performing the same tasks with the same 
communities permits them to develop an effective and efficient modus operandi and build a 
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trusting relationship with the communities. On the other hand, ‘long duration’ officers can 
profit from their position by building networks of patronage and promoting very personal 
interests (i.e. gaining money or favours through their position of authority). In the second 
pattern, all too common given the lack of transparency of the transfer mechanism, career 
officers can be transferred by central government decision suddenly and without justification. 
This of course can be seen as a means of fighting corruption by ‘long duration’ officers, but it 
reduces efficiency and limits the incentives of officials to engage in good work in the 
community.  
In addition to horizontal accountability mechanisms such as the CIAA, Nepali acts and 
regulations foresee vertical accountability mechanisms to control the power of local 
authorities. Recently (see the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act, LSGA, and Regulation, 
LSGR) social accountability tools were introduced in governmental guidelines for local 
governance, among them social audits, community score cards and citizens’ fora. This 
demonstrates a growing sensitivity of central authorities to issues of good governance and 
accountability. However, the implementation of such mechanisms is often very problematic. 
Firstly, being accountable to their citizens is not a priority for local authorities. The officers 
who now hold the whole formal power at local level are appointed by the central government 
and their positions do not depend on public opinion. Hence, their accountability efforts are 
directed first of all towards the central government. This is also due to inadequacies and 
ambiguities in the LSGA on how power and authority are shared among different governing 
units. One basic principle of LSGA is to make local governing units accountable to the people 
in their respective jurisdictions. However, the ambiguous roles in hierarchical structures have 
resulted in upward accountability. According to the Act the central government has the role of 
monitoring and supervising local bodies. This provision makes the lower governing body 
accountable to the upper ones rather than to their own constituencies. These legal provisions 
maintain and strengthen the upward chain of control. In addition, the Act provides power to 
the central government to suspend and dissolve the local bodies on several grounds. 
Similarly, the Act provides for rights and powers of central government to make special 
grants to any of the local bodies. This too makes central government or the upper tiers of the 
governing body more powerful and influential vis-à-vis the lower tiers by virtue of the former’s 
capacity to allocate resources and impose conditionality. 
Secondly, the environment of mistrust of authorities creates difficulties in the mobilisation of 
the community for social accountability. Because of the long heritage of poor transparency 
and accountability, people’s attitude towards authorities has been suspicious. Hence, the 
potential of mobilising people by local authorities is low: sometimes, local authorities ask the 
help of civil society actors (local NGOs among others), whose mobilisation potential is higher. 
Often in the development field reference is made to the empowerment of citizens and 
communities (see below), but recently many agencies have recognised the importance of 
empowering state actors as well. Indeed, even if state actors are motivated by positive 
political will, they often do not have the resources and capacities to improve their governance 
mechanism and this task is even more difficult because of the suspicious and hard-to-change 
attitude of the population towards authorities.  
Thirdly, examples of questionable implementation of social accountability tools by local 
authorities are numerous, which reinforces people’s mistrust and suspicion in accountability’s 
promotion by authorities. An example is public meetings organised by local authorities to 
which only other officials are invited, where the media are paid to give positive coverage, and 
the doors are closed to people’s participation. As a result, attempts to promote accountability 
by local authorities are often perceived by people, but also by civil society actors in general, 
as rhetorical formality used to increase the legitimacy of the status quo rather than to improve 
good governance and real people’s involvement.  
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The combination of the processes described here with a spread of numerous types of 
accountability tools (public, downward, social, etc.) used both by state and civil society 
actors, leads to the risk of bureaucratisation of such tools and to a consequent loss of their 
meaning. Although the implementation of accountability tools by state actors can be seen at 
a first glance as a positive achievement, we heard comments by development agents who 
are sceptical about the spread of such practices in governmental frameworks. The scepticism 
portends the risk of losing the (already difficult to achieve) confidence of people in such 
practices, if these practices lose their meaning by being employed only as formalities by 
authorities.  
6.1.2 Political parties: informal accountability mechanisms 
 
The formal control mechanisms that apply to political parties are even weaker. The APM was 
not controlled by a formal public accountability tool such as elections. Political 
representatives did not have to fear elections because the party appointed them. Thus, their 
accountability imperative was towards their party (at the local and national level) and not to 
the people. However, after the peace agreement in 2006 people have been anticipating local 
elections, so, although they were not elected, today’s politicians feel the pressure of future 
elections. An interesting question is whether and how the dissolution of the APM had an 
influence on accountability practices at local level. We could observe that the de facto 
decision-making process had not changed markedly. But has the accountability relationship 
between parties and bureaucrats and between parties and community changed? In this study 
we do not have many elements to answer this question. In addition, the APM was dissolved 
just a month before the research started and changes in respect of accountability will 
probably happen more slowly. The prospect of elections may well continue to constitute an 
incentive for politicians to act properly.  
Furthermore, at the very local level accountability passes through informal mechanisms 
rather than through formal ones (see below). With the lack of local elections, accountability of 
local political representatives to the community is based almost solely on such informal 
channels, and it is via them that reputation and prestige can be sanctioned.  
Moreover, while the APM was active, political parties were engaging in entities in which they 
had no formal role such as school management committees and community based 
organisations (CBOs). This demonstrates that at the local level political parties often abide by 
informal norms in determining their relations and influences. In some cases their involvement 
may promote accountable and informed decision making, but in other cases party affiliates 
may pursue solely individual or partisan interest, risking the politicisation of these entities. For 
all these reasons we can presume that there will not be substantial changes after the de-
formalisation of political parties’ power. Furthermore, the dissolution of APM was announced 
as a temporary measure against corruption, while looking forward to the new constitution, 
which should lead to local elections.  
6.2 Community based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) 
 
In the communities we visited, the Public Audit Practice and the trail bridge user committee 
are not the only participatory spaces. Other participatory spaces are community institutions 
like community based organisations (CBOs) in the field of forest, irrigation, drinking water, 
cooperatives, health and education. CBOs have spread in the last ten to fifteen years and are 
now a strong presence in the communities. Most were created with the input of external 
actors, whether international agencies, local NGOs or (less frequently) the government. In 
many cases CBOs are created in the framework of development interventions. In these 
cases, CBOs are invited spaces, i.e. spaces created by a powerful actor, who invites the 
community to participate. In other cases grassroots movements are the creators of the new 
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spaces and sometimes are later helped by external actors. These cases are examples of 
claimed spaces, i.e. new participatory spaces established by the community.  
 
6.2.1 Accountability practices 
 
The CBOs we observed activate different kinds of accountability mechanisms depending on 
their different degrees of formality and institutionalisation. In general, accountability 
mechanisms of CBOs towards the community are based on regular public meetings in which 
all members of the organisation can participate. Normally a committee carries out the 
executive tasks while the rest of the members participate in the meetings, following the 
happenings and the committee’s work (which is also the basic concept of Public Audit 
Practice). Information is shared in such meetings and the public has the opportunity to 
question the committee’s work. However, meaningful participation in the meetings is strongly 
influenced by social and economic variables, and invisible power structures shape the 
meetings by partially excluding women and disadvantaged people from meaningful 
participation. Moreover, committees are often formed (or at least controlled) by elites and 
powerful local people. In the case of most CBOs, too, accountability passes through informal 
channels rather than through the formal ones provided: information in both directions (from 
CBOs to the community and vice versa) seems to pass through everyday natural and 
personal channels, and thus the formal meetings should be understood as catalysts rather 
than as the information sharing process itself.11  
Informal everyday conversations and information exchanges can thus have a role as 
accountability mechanisms. On the one hand informal accountability mechanisms may allow 
excluded sections of the community to get involved in the decision-making process, at least 
informally, when otherwise they could not. On the other hand informal mechanisms are not 
regulated by guidelines about inclusion and participation quotas and may thus strengthen 
existing dynamics of exclusion.12 Indeed, natural communication networks and channels are 
mostly based on relationships of kinship, caste/ethnicity, gender and economic status. In this 
way, accountability risks becoming trapped within such networks and not reaching the very 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups.  
6.2.2 The spread of development interventions 
 
International aid in Nepal started to flow in Nepal in the 1950s, but it was mostly after the first 
People’s Movement in the 1990s that civil society organisations flourished at all levels (from 
local to national), thereby diffusing discourses on participation, democracy and development. 
However, such discourses entered (and still enter today) an environment of mistrust towards 
power holders, including towards powerful civil society actors.  
Lack of transparency and accountability has characterised (and to a great extent still 
characterise) the country’s history, not only on the part of governmental authorities but also 
on the part of development organisations. In particular, during the civil war, cases of 
politicisation, corruption or hijacking of development interventions led to a decrease of 
people’s trust in the latter. As regards politicisation, political parties remain very prominent at 
the local level even today and a common strategy to broaden their influence, reputation and 
power is to assume control of projects, interventions or even entire local NGOs. Since the 
1990s, the number of registered NGOs of all kinds and dimensions has boomed in Nepal. 
Also the availability of resources for development has increased, but not as much as the 
number of registered NGOs (the only ones that can receive international funds). Thus, the 
competition between NGOs has become a crucial factor in the development scenario of 
                                                 
11 The observations of this paragraph apply mostly to the visited trail bridge projects as well and are discussed more in depth 
later.  
12 As observed later, also formal mechanisms with inclusion guidelines and quotas cannot guarantee a meaningful participation.  
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Nepal and market rules are dominating the struggle for resources. Social exclusion issues 
also arise here: NGOs are generally dominated by high caste, wealthy, well educated men, 
even though this is changing in very recent times with positions in NGOs reserved for 
disadvantaged groups (women, low caste, minorities).  
In spite of the many problematic issues just described, the spread of NGOs and participatory 
spaces shows the vitality of a civil society that has long been limited by an almost non-
democratic political environment. CBOs and local NGOs can be regarded as the constituent 
elements for crafting an embedded structure of local governance in Nepal. These groups 
have gained considerable governance experience and are demanding recognition of their 
role in local governance.  
6.2.3 Empowerment through social work13 
 
In addition to the assumptions of increased intervention effectiveness, increased ownership 
and the diffusion of desirable democratic habits per se, empowerment represents another 
target output of participatory approaches (see Conceptual background). With the described 
spread of civil society organisations and development intervention, the possibilities for people 
to become members of a group or a committee, i.e. of doing social work, have multiplied. 
Engaging in social work brings people many benefits: first of all reputational ones. Secondly, 
working in CBOs represents an opportunity for learning useful technical, social, managerial 
and political skills, which can also be used in other contexts to improve an individual’s 
position in the community. Moreover, personal relationships and contacts are built, which are 
a very important resource in a rural society based mostly on personal and informal 
exchanges. In this sense, people are using a part of the development rent, which I argue can 
be measured more in terms of skill learning, contact building and reputation rather than in 
monetary terms (see again Conceptual background). 
 
An interesting phenomenon we observed in the field is the creation of a tight network around 
CBOs. We observed that people doing social work frequently have the characteristics 
described above for the trail bridge user committees we met: male, well educated, wealthy, 
high caste and already with some reputation in the community (social status). Moreover, it is 
very likely that one person holds offices in more than one organisation. Thus, a tight network 
of personal relations is created around social work and consequently social work 
engagement becomes a further variable in the social stratification of society and may 
strengthen the existing exclusion patterns.  
The personal story of a man we met in the second village is a very good example of the 
process of empowerment through participation in development projects and civil society 
organisations. The man, about thirty-five years old, comes from a disadvantaged group 
(Dalit) and began his ‘career’ seven years ago, when he started working for a local 
development project funded by international agencies. After two years he was ‘promoted’ and 
he was entrusted with an important position within the project. He explained to us that 
through the social work he learned many skills: he attended trainings in agriculture and also 
in management and accounting. Moreover, he built a tight network of personal relations with 
authorities, local NGOs and international agencies. He repeatedly declared to us that he 
always wanted to develop his village, which was at the time very backward, and that he 
always had in mind how to develop his village. Today he is one of the wealthiest people in 
the village and he participates in many CBOs. He is also recognised as one of the most 
                                                 
13 In this report I generally speak of social work, which is the term used in the communities to define every kind of engagement 
in work for the community. Political activities are included in the definitions we could gather on the field, while civil servants’ work 
is not. Social work could therefore be intended as unpaid community work, considering yet that in some cases social work is 
symbolically remunerated.  
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influential people in the community, which resorts to him in the event of collective problems. 
Thanks to his personal relations he was able to find out how to formally apply for the trail 
bridge: this happened in a very accidental way during a meeting about another project, in 
which some representatives of the VDC and DDC and a local NGO were present. The man 
expressed the village’s need for a trail bridge and was informed how to follow the formal 
procedure for the bridge application. Once the bridge project was approved, he entered the 
user committee, in which he holds a central position. The man had a limited education, but 
during his seven years of social work he learned all the necessary skills to lead a project. 
This story is a good example of empowerment through social work and shows how the 
development rent is rather non-monetary and relies mostly on social capital. The question is 
consequently how this acquired power will be used. The man declared that he wants to 
develop the village and thanks to his engagement the community obtained many facilities 
and projects. Without powerful local personalities engaging for the community it is very 
difficult for the latter to obtain help and, finally, to develop. However, still too much depends 
on the good will of such (traditional and new) ‘elites’, whose power in the community is 
difficult to control and which is based mostly on informal relationship of patronage. Thus, 
whoever holds power of this kind has broad freedom to use it for own interests or for the 
interests of the community. Moreover, the creation and strengthening of patron–client 
relationships does not help the diffusion of democratic processes and leaves disadvantaged 
and marginalised people in a position of dependency.  
6.2.4 Empowerment through community meetings and audits 
 
With the diffusion of the community approach, responsibilities in the framework of 
development interventions were gradually shifted to the local community by creating project-
specific committees and by including community meetings and audits in the project cycles 
(e.g. the Public Audit Practice). Like the involvement in an organisation or in a committee, but 
to a smaller extent, community meetings can represent a means to empower people of the 
community. Although I will affirm later that the meaningful participation of many people in 
such meetings is limited, these meetings should indeed represent a ‘model’ of democratic 
process. It is often true that many people cannot understand everything in the meetings and 
that they are intimidated and prefer not to exercise their voice; however, the meaningful 
participation of everybody is not something that can be achieved suddenly and quickly. But 
by attending one, two, three, ten and more meetings people slowly come in contact with 
democratic practices and they slowly develop a stronger awareness of their rights: this is a 
process that fits the definition of empowerment. Thus, although the real life context of project 
implementation is challenging, a discourse on participation, transparency and accountability 
is slowly getting a footing, through the repeated appeals and initiatives of development 
agencies among others. Villagers become increasingly used to participation techniques and 
to discourses on accountability and good governance. While speaking with them we often 
heard typical concepts like ‘working for the community’, ‘inclusion of the whole population’, 
‘being an active part of my own development’ and statements like ‘previously I was not 
participating in community works, but now I know that it is important’. We spoke with many 
women who told us how they have become aware, over the years, of their right to take part in 
collective decisions and now slowly begin to participate and exercise their voice, despite the 
basically patriarchal social structure of the context where they are living.  
A problematic point in this process might be the multiplication of different kinds of community 
meetings and audits, with different degrees of de facto participation and transparency 
(remember the above paragraph on corruption and politicisation of NGOs and CBOs). This 
variety of ‘models’, definitions and implementations can lead to confusion and disorientation 
in the communities and thus hamper the sound diffusion of democratic practices.   
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Another problematic point is whether and how such discourses and declaration are then 
concretely translated into practice. The risk is that, often, such discourses remain just 
discourses and that, in their practical implementation, accountability and participation are still 
limited and biased. It is thus more difficult to assess whether, beyond discourses, a culture of 
participation, transparency and accountability is growing. Moreover, there are many other 
contextual factors that influence the growing of such a culture.  
The counterpart of citizens’ rights is citizens’ responsibilities. Current discourses on 
citizenship and development are focusing more on rights than on the responsibilities of 
citizens. The discourses that we heard in the communities on citizenship were also focusing 
mostly on rights. People are getting used to the idea that local authorities have duties and 
responsibilities towards them and that they, consequently, have rights vis-à-vis authorities. 
The concept of responsibilities refers more often to the immediate community: it seems that 
people feel the importance (the responsibility) of engaging and working together for the 
community. The sense of obligation to the community is being strengthened through recent 
discourses on participatory development, but it is already rooted in the local tradition of rural 
contexts, where the sense of belonging to the community is higher than in urban (and more 
anonymous) contexts. Although the idea of responsibilities towards authorities is less 
developed, people are nevertheless aware of some obligations that they have to undertake in 
order to receive goods or services, for instance to participate in a meeting in order to have a 
trail bridge. The point here, which should be investigated through further research, is what 
kind of responsibility do people feel while participating in such meetings: is this a mechanical 
and formal act and do people feel their physical participation as a kind of ‘payment’ for the 
delivered good or service? Do they feel they need to be seen at the meetings because they 
fear local political, resource distribution or patronage repercussions? Or is this a more deep 
civic feeling of the responsibility of every citizen to participate in the decision-making process 
in a democratic society? 
Other factors are influencing people’s awareness of their rights as citizens. First of all, even 
though gaps in the education system and diffusion are still ample, basic education is today 
provided to the majority of Nepalis (Unicef 2012). Media can also play a crucial role in the 
sensitisation of people as citizens. However, in the remote regions of the country the 
diffusion of media is still at a very early phase. In the localities we visited in the mid hills, 
news from the district and national capital are difficult to obtain. In contrast, in the southern 
flatland media are widespread, with access to newspapers, radio and (to a lesser extent) 
television being provided to most people. In particular, local media are often promoting and 
diffusing discourses on development and participation, providing space for disadvantaged 
groups to express their voice and assuming often the role of advocates for public issues.  
Another process is shaping power relations and participation patterns at local level: 
migration. The small village we visited in Surkhet (Ratamata, see Annex I) is characterised 
by enormous migration rates. In the village in Chitwan (Kumroj) migration rates are also high 
but not enormous as in Ratamata. The migration patterns of the two localities are very 
different: Ratamata has low skilled migration to Gulf countries, Malaysia and India. In addition 
to a similar low skilled migration, Kumroj has also a higher skilled migration to Western 
countries, mostly to the United States. Moreover, in Kumroj we could also observe an intra-
national migration to the district capital and to Kathmandu, for work as well as for study. In 
Ratamata the changes caused by migration can be observed in the social organisation of the 
community and concern mostly the relationship between sexes. Being a very small village 
with a very high male migration rate, very few young men remain in the village. Suddenly, the 
organisation of social life in the village relies on women. Women now have to carry out, 
beside their traditional (reproductive and productive) tasks, the tasks traditionally ascribed to 
men, among which are the social and political tasks in the community. Thus, on the one 
hand, women are learning social and political skills, in a process that leads to their 
empowerment. On the other hand, women are being overburdened because they have to 
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carry out twice as much (or more) work. Moreover, we could observe that the control 
exercised by male emigrants on their wives, sisters and daughters is still very strong. This 
control is exercised by husbands mostly through their parents, in whose houses the wives 
habitually live according to tradition. Furthermore, the few men left in the village are 
dominating the social organisation of the community, thereby hampering women from really 
taking control of the community. The different migration rate and pattern in Kumroj do not 
have such palpable influences on the village as in Ratamata. Since the rates are lower, men 
are still largely represented in the community. Our research did not produce enough material 
to answer such questions, and was never intended to explore migration, but it would be 
interesting to further investigate whether and how the migration pattern of Kumroj is shaping 
the social structures of the village, thereby considering also the influence of external ideas 
and values that can reach the village from the migration destinations within and outside the 
country and from everyday contact with international tourists.  
6.3 The trail bridge user committee 
 
Beside the space of the Public Audit Practice (see below), another important participatory 
space is created through the trail bridge project at the local level: the space of the user 
committee (UC). As already ascertained, the community approach to development 
intervention foresees the shifting of some responsibilities to the local community. This 
happens with a selected part of the community being invested with special power and 
responsibilities for the duration of the project. Like other project specific committees, the trail 
bridge UC is located halfway between the state (central government, local bodies), 
HELVETAS’s TBSU and the local service provider on the one hand and the local community 
at the other (see Annex V). Firstly, the UC assumes some tasks that were previously carried 
out by the government (or by development organisations). Secondly, the UC represents the 
community in the implementation of the project: the UC is given negotiation power towards 
state actors and NGOs14 and should represent the voice of the community. Thus, the UC’s 
accountability is twofold: upward towards the state and the NGOs, which delegate to it part of 
the project execution, and downward towards the community, whose preferences the UC is 
supposed to represent.  
Before analysing the accountability mechanisms characterising its work, it is necessary to 
remember briefly the concrete tasks of the UC (see also Annex III and IV) and to sketch out 
its relationship with the other actors involved in the trail bridge project (see also Annex V). 
Among the actors ‘above’ it (i.e. local authorities, TBSU and LSP), the UC has the closest 
relationship with the LSP. LSP staff regularly visit the bridge site and meet the UC in order to 
organise the work. The LSP follows very closely all steps of the bridge construction and gives 
technical, social and administrative support. For instance, the LSP explains to the UC how to 
keep the bridge documentation and accounts and which steps are needed for bridge building. 
The LSP is the coordinator between the DDC and the UC; for example specific material that 
cannot be found or produced in the community is provided by the DDC and delivered to the 
committee through the LSP and sometimes through TBSU. The contact of the UC with TBSU 
staff is less frequent, but regular: TBSU staff visit the bridge site (i.e. it visits the committee) 
at critical milestones of the bridge construction, checks the technical work and informs the 
UC and the LSP about the technical progress of the work. The contact of the UC with local 
authorities is less regular. In fact, the VDC does not have an active role in the construction 
process. Hence, there is contact between VDC and UC (or LSP) only if there is a problem 
that should be solved with the VDC (e.g. delays in the delivery of the budget by VDC). DDC 
engineers sometimes visit the bridge site to give technical support. Also with DDC, contact is 
required in case of a problem (e.g. again, a delay in budget delivery).  
                                                 
14 By speaking of ‘NGOs’ in the context of the trail bridge project I intend both the local service provider (as a local NGO) and 
HELVETAS Nepal (as an INGO).  
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As they are chosen from the bridge users’ community, UC members are at the same time 
beneficiaries of the bridge. This means that UC members are automatically in constant 
contact with the community (or better, with a part of it, following the cited channels – of 
kinship, caste/ethnicity, etc. – of informal interactions), because they are part of it. The formal 
moments of contact between the community and their representatives in the committee are 
the Public Audit Practice. Moreover, specific contacts regarding the bridge project happen 
around the concrete works on the bridge. One of the UC’s tasks is to mobilise the community 
to work for the bridge and to coordinate the concrete work on the bridge site: UC members 
acquire the necessary knowledge through a training input and later, step by step, through the 
LSP and the TBSU.  
6.3.1 Accountability practices 
 
The most formal and structured accountability mechanism activated in the trail bridge project 
by the UC is the Public Audit Practice. On these formal occasions information about the 
project is shared and decisions are taken by consent with the community (see also Annex 
III): in other words, the committee is required to show and practice its accountability. 
However, the UC’s accountability passes through other less formal and less structured 
channels. Upward accountability is exercised in less formal meetings between the parties: as 
said above, during the whole duration of bridge works the UC meets more or less regularly 
the TBSU, the LSP and the local authorities. In the same way, UC’s downward accountability 
towards the community passes also through other less formal and not institutionalised 
mechanisms. As already observed, UC members are at the same time members of the 
community they represent. The localities we visited are situated in a rural context, where 
villages are organised according to traditional structures, which also include social control 
mechanisms. Social control relies on reputational costs and is effective in contexts where the 
size of the community is small enough to allow people to know each other very well. The size 
and the organisation of the communities we visited ensure that the behaviour of UC 
members is controlled through the natural everyday exchange of information during informal 
conversations. Thus, through such informal channels the community is regularly informed 
about the trail bridge and committee members are informed about the opinions and needs of 
the community regarding the bridge. The incentive for UC members to act conscientiously is 
the recognition of their work by the community, which would increase their prestige in the 
community. At the same time they have a disincentive to act unconscientiously because this 
would lead to losses in their reputation.  
I described the position of the UC on the supply side of the accountability relation. However, 
the committee is also situated on the demand side inasmuch as it also requires accountability 
from the actors ‘above’ it, namely local bodies and NGOs. The UC has a specific role as 
intermediary between local authorities and the community in the process of demanding public 
accountability (see also Annex V). Indeed, the broad community has the opportunity to 
demand accountability from local authorities mostly in the formal spaces of the public 
meetings. However, the committee, as a representative of the community, has the 
opportunity to come closer to local authorities and request them to be responsible and 
answerable. For instance, in case of delay in transfer of resources by local authorities, it is a 
task of the UC (sometimes together with the LSP) to question the authorities about the delay 
and to request both the budget and an explanation for the delay. In this sense, the UC uses 
its special position within the project to hold authorities accountable. The same mechanism is 
activated between the UC and NGOs, but in this case I would call that downward 
accountability in its stricter sense, rather than public accountability. Also such accountability 
mechanisms are based almost on informal relations and personal contacts. They are 
implemented through the individual initiative of UC members, who go in person to the DDC 
office and request information or money. It is important to observe that in this process the 
role of the LSP is crucial: if the committee members do not have individual initiative, do not  
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trust themselves to speak with local authorities or just do not know how to do it, the LSP 
supports the UC in such tasks.  
6.3.2 The participatory space of the user committee and its boundaries 
 
I described the bridge committee with regards to its upward and downward accountability. 
Now, I would like to analyse the characteristics of the specific space of the committee and its 
(formal and factual) boundaries. Indeed, the UC itself can be seen as a participatory space 
provided through the project’s organisation (see also Annex V). The UC can be seen as an 
invited space: the state, together with the NGOs, creates this space (according to the 
governmental guideline for the bridge construction) and invites selected community members 
to participate. Thus, the UC has a special characteristic: it is an invited space, but after the 
‘invitation’ it becomes a closed space, reserved to a selected group of people. In order to 
create an inclusive committee, governmental guidelines define its composition relying on 
proportionate representation of beneficiaries, with quotas reserved both for women and 
discriminated groups. The quotas are fulfilled and at least one main position in the committee 
is given to a ‘disadvantaged’ member. The whole community cannot participate in the 
committee, but has to designate representatives who will have the permission to enter the 
space. Thus, a space that was previously closed (with the centralised approach to trail bridge 
construction) is now opened to a selected part of the community (with the community 
approach, see also Context). The ‘election’ of the UC happens during the Public Hearing. As 
far as we could see and hear the ‘election’ happens in a consensus way: the community 
proposes some people and these automatically become committee members; often these 
people are the ones who were already involved in the initiation of the project before the 
hearing.  
The formal and official boundaries of the trail bridge UC are set firstly by the governmental 
guideline and secondly by the community during the Public Hearing, according to the de jure 
power that both the guideline and the community formally hold in respect to the formation of 
the committee. However, the de facto power of the community to participate in the meetings 
and consequently decide about the formation of the UC is limited by a range of social, 
cultural and practical restraints (see next section). Therefore, it is often only a part of the 
community that in fact selects UC members. In the cases we visited, people who are 
selected to be members of the UC often have common characteristics: they are mostly 
wealthy and educated people who already have some experience in social work and 
reputation in the community. The tasks of the committee are not very easy and it is thus 
unlikely that the community chooses a person who does not possess good education and 
experience. Indeed, the first aim of the trail bridge project is to build a bridge in a quick and 
efficient way. In order to do that, it requires a UC composed of people who have the 
necessary capacities. Although the project includes training and skill development for 
committee members, of course the more skills the members already have, the more efficient 
the work of the committee is likely to be. As I already pointed out for the general case of 
CBOs, working for the trail bridge UC, too, is a way of empowerment on different levels: 
members can learn technical, social, managerial and political skills, strengthen own social 
networks both within and outside the community (also with important actors as NGOs and 
local authorities) and improve their reputation in the community. Channelling these benefits 
(also) towards the disadvantaged part of the population is an objective of ‘transformational 
social mobilisation’ (see Context) that is not contemplated in ‘transactional social 
mobilisation’. However, if the people actively working in the UC are the ones who are already 
powerful in the community (as it is often the case), there is the risk of further strengthening 
those powerful people and increasing the gap with the rest of the community. 
We could observe that out of the formal frame of the Public Hearing other boundaries are 
informally set. Indeed, we met the interesting figure of the User Committee Advisor, who, 
although not an official member of the committee, works closely with it, follows the work and 
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happenings and provides his advice within the committee. Although the position is not 
institutionalised in the guidelines, local people perceive it as official. The Advisor is in fact a 
completely unofficial position, arbitrary and not subjected to any kind of formal control. 
Normally, UC Advisors are men who could not or did not want to enter officially the 
committee for any number of reasons: an example are teachers, who are not allowed to enter 
the committee. Moreover, advisors normally have experience with social work and have a 
position of respect within the community. With the unofficial position of the advisor, the 
boundaries of the user committee are shaped outside of the formal Public Hearing and are 
set by powerful people in the community.   
Other unofficial boundaries are drawn also within the official UC. As already mentioned a 
system of quotas guarantees the formal inclusion of women and disadvantaged groups in the 
committee. However, this does not mean that the selected disadvantaged people are able to 
actively participate in the committee. Indeed, we could observe invisible power playing a 
central role in shaping the modus operandi of the committee by limiting the meaningful 
participation of disadvantaged members, thus shaping the internal factual boundaries of the 
committee.  
Women are included in the committee, but a long tradition of exclusion inhibits them from 
really exercising their position in the group. Local traditional society is based on a strong 
patriarchal model. The roles (and rules) are traditionally fixed, dividing male tasks and female 
ones. Community work, politics (in a broad sense) and the contact with authorities are all 
tasks traditionally reserved to men. Thus, even though they can be physically present15, in 
group discussions women traditionally speak only if they are explicitly requested or if the 
issue discussed is explicitly and directly linked with them. Women do not dare to speak also 
because they often have had less education than men, which is also a heritage of patriarchal 
society, where education was provided preferentially to boys. There are also practical 
reasons for the limited participation of women. In the villages we visited, women are very 
overburdened with work: indeed, they have to carry out all reproductive tasks in the house as 
well as hard productive tasks in the fields. Thus, the gender division of work leaves less time 
to women to be invested in social work and in skill development. In the participatory space of 
the UC, power is given to women de jure, inasmuch as they have the right and even the duty 
(in order to fulfil the quotas) to participate. However, invisible power structures inhibit them 
from meaningfully participating de facto. We observed that discourses on women 
empowerment, women participation, gender equity and the like are widespread in the 
communities. However, by comparing the discourses I heard with the reality I saw, I can 
argue that such discourses are often only rhetoric and could not yet achieve change in the 
fundamental structure of the society. This is of course a very long process, which includes 
the reshaping of old traditional meanings and habits. The fact that such discourses have 
started to circulate in the community can be seen as a first step in the long process to 
achieve gender equality. Disadvantaged groups (ethnic groups, low castes) face the same 
restraints faced by women and described in this paragraph: although power is given to them 
de jure in the space of the UC (through quotas and inclusion requirements), invisible power 
structures limit their actual participation in the group.  
Thus, even if the committee is inclusive on paper, it is not self evident that participation in it 
will be inclusive. The committee is very often dominated by traditional elites (men, high caste, 
well educated, wealthy) and other members sometimes have no space to really express their 
opinion and defend their interests. Moreover, the participation of women and disadvantaged 
groups is limited by invisible power structures. The latter create a sense of self-censorship 
and intimidation, which decreases the motivation to participate actively. Indeed, a very 
                                                 
15 Often women do not participate at all because of the restraints explained here, but in general the physical presence of women 
in community discussions does not seem to be problematic. In the framework of development projects, guidelines by the 
government or by agencies underline the importance of their presence, but yet their participation is hampered by the restraints 
described in these paragraphs.  
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common mechanism we observed is the participation only on paper, in the very sense of the 
expression: women (mostly, but also members from disadvantaged groups or other people 
who are too overburdened) do not physically participate in committee meetings, but only later 
write their signature on the minutes. We could notice that the real activity of the UC (normally 
of nine to fifteen people) is carried out by a very limited number of persons, namely three to 
five high caste, wealthy, educated and socially engaged men. Thus, committee meetings are 
often meetings of that small group and are consequently dominated by it. Moreover, most 
other tasks of the committee including contact with the LSP, TBSU and local authorities are 
carried out by that small group, which means the creation of social work networks (see 
Annex V).  
6.4 The participatory space of the Public Audit Practice 
 
Beside the invited/closed participatory space of the trail bridge user committee, the main 
participatory spaces created by the trail bridge project are those of the Public Audit Practice 
(see Context and Annex III for a detailed description of the practice). The LSP organises the 
Public Hearing, while the organisation of Public Review and Audit is a task of the committee. 
The presence of both actors is compulsory, as is the participation of a TBSU representative. 
Local authorities (DDC and VDC) are strongly invited to participate, but in fact their 
participation is far from given. Donor agencies that pay their funds into the common basket of 
the local bridges subsector of the governmental Department (see Context) are not 
represented since the funds, once they come in the basket, are handled as state resources. 
The whole community is invited to participate and this happens normally with the informal 
tool of ‘word of mouth’ invitation, namely UC members (or LSP staff) going door-to-door 
inviting people to the meetings.   
6.4.1 Incentives, disincentives and restraints to participation 
 
The participation of the ‘invited actors’ (local authorities and broader community) in the 
meetings is limited by a range of disincentives and costs. For local authorities the benefits of 
participation consist mostly of reputation, recognition and legitimacy in the community, but 
these incentives are not supported by formal sanctions in case of nonparticipation. Moreover, 
the costs of participation may be manifold. First, material constraints of time limit the 
participation of local authorities. This problem lies well beyond the case of PAP, with local 
authorities being often overburdened and lacking adequate human and material resources. 
Second, as public meetings are an occasion where people might more or less freely ask 
questions to local authorities, the latter often prefer not to participate, so that they do not 
have to provide answers.  
For the broader community, participation costs are mostly material. Investing hours in 
meetings whose outputs and final usefulness are not really tangible does not attract people, 
who prefer to invest those hours in their everyday tasks. Indeed, like in all democratic 
mechanisms, individual participation may seem not to bring concrete benefits to individuals 
and the free rider problem is found in Nepal as well as in the rest of the world. Thus, we 
observed that UC members, LSP staff and other engaged people of the community have to 
insist and convince people to participate, by using the rhetoric of democracy and trying to 
‘teach’ people the importance of everybody’s participation.  
Another reason why people may not willingly attend public meetings is that in many cases 
their meaningful participation in discussions is limited by cultural and social restraints. I 
already described how social structures and traditions limit the meaningful participation of 
disadvantaged and marginalised people in the space of the bridge committee. We could also 
clearly see that many people from the broader community who attend the meetings in fact 
often do not completely understand what is said and discussed and, if asked, cannot  
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re-explain the contents, because they lack the capacity of analysing phenomena and events 
or of reproducing the thoughts in words. The intellectual participation is much more complex 
than the simply presence at the meetings. These observations also underline a 
communicative problem between those who have to present information or a message and 
their audience: it can be argued that the presenters may not have found the best way to 
convey their message to an audience whose realities are different from their own. In such a 
vicious circle people can be intimidated or frustrated and their meaningful participation is 
even more limited.  
Thus, although the participatory space of the PAP is formally open to everybody, in fact 
boundaries and limits to meaningful participation are shaped by the existing social and 
cultural structures and traditions. The latter can be seen as the manifestation of invisible 
power. De jure, power is given to the whole community, inasmuch as the whole community is 
invited in the invited participatory space of the PAP and has the possibility of taking part in 
the decision-making process and of questioning the actors in power. Hidden power 
determines the social structures lying beyond the actors’ room for manoeuvre, i.e. their 
capacity of setting the agenda and the issues to be discussed in the meeting. Of course, the 
implementers of PAP have an important room of manoeuvre, in the sense that the UC, 
together with the LSP and the TBSU, can decide what issues will be discussed in the 
meeting and when. However, while observing the dynamics of the meetings, but even more 
their preparation, we noticed that this power is exercised mostly by the NGOs, which ‘explain’ 
to UC members how to conduct the meeting and in this way shape its development and 
implementation. Moreover, during the meeting not everybody can completely follow the 
contents: this fact, together with social structures of discrimination – that is, invisible power –, 
limits the factual power of many people to exercise their voice. As a consequence of hidden 
and invisible power structures, the most powerful people of the community (i.e. the most 
educated and with the biggest reputation) have the possibility to ‘direct’ the development of 
discussions in the public meetings.  
6.4.2 The symbolic space of the Public Audit Practice 
 
The PAP represents a formalised space of information and participation. However, I showed 
how the meaningful participation within it has some limitations. While talking with people 
about the bridge, we noticed that they had accessed the information about the project mostly 
through informal channels, which follow specific vectors of diffusion. These vectors are 
mostly linked with kinship, caste/ethnicity, friendship and social work networks. We also 
observed that people normally do not know much about or do not remember much of the 
public meetings (whether held in the framework of the trail bridge project or of other projects). 
Thus, it can be argued that PAP is not the main information channel for project related 
information. Rather, PAP is the occasion for the information process to be started: after the 
first seeds are sown during the PAP, information will spread throughout the community 
through informal channels. Thus, the PAP should be seen as a starting point (a catalyst) of 
the information sharing process. Moreover, as PAP events are of short duration and some of 
its time is consumed by regular formalities (and by rhetorical speeches, see next paragraph), 
there is often insufficient time left for detailed discussions and debates. Thus, these meetings 
can play the role of instigator or initiator of further discussion and debates.  
The PAP is a high symbolic space, i.e. an arena where the various actors present 
themselves and negotiate together. As explained in the Conceptual background, by ‘arena’ I 
mean the broad (and also abstract) space of interaction between actors. In the case of PAP, 
this arena comes to be very concrete and ‘tangible’. Indeed, it is a physical space where 
people physically meet, see each other and discuss. Thus, actors can use that space to 
present themselves, build their image in the community and promote their own message, 
which allows them also, in some cases, to hijack the meetings for their political and electoral 
aspirations. The broad use of rhetorical speeches during the meetings can also have the 
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consequence of diverting the attention and the motivation of the public to pay attention to the 
content of the meeting. Indeed, a very large part of the time in meetings is occupied by 
formal speeches. The latter are held mostly by local authorities (in the rare case they are 
present), political parties (although they do not have a formal role in the project, they are 
often involved in the initiation process as well as in UC’s work), LSP and TBSU. 
During the meetings, moreover, the facilitation, the spatial configuration and in general non-
verbal messages influence markedly the way in which people perceive the various actors and 
their role in the project. For instance, participation of local authorities in the meetings is very 
limited. I already highlighted that local authorities often avoid attending meetings because of 
the risk of having to face the demands, complaints and grievances of the community. Since 
people usually do not have opportunity to interact with the local officials, they are tempted to 
use any occasion whenever and wherever possible to voice their concerns and grievances 
collectively. Thus, even if they are present, officers often assume a reluctant attitude during 
the meeting: they hold the necessary formal speeches and try then to slide into the 
background, thus avoiding the attention of people. This attitude of officers during the 
meeting, together with the prominent role of UC, LSP and TBSU in the facilitation of the 
meeting, can lead people to believe that state actors do not have an important role in the 
project. The problem I see here is that the trust in the government/state is so low that it is 
very difficult for people to recognise the actions of the state, because of the widespread 
assumption that, anyway, the state does not do anything for the community. Moreover, the 
lack of interface between the state and its citizens calls into question the legitimacy of the 
state.  
Two other issues are topical in literature on development and are consistent with the 
previous observations, namely both processes of decentralisation and shifting of 
responsibilities away from the state (Korf 2010). Decentralisation has become a central 
approach to development and in Nepal has also been promoted by the government (see 
Context). At the same time, a process of ‘outsourcing’ from the state has taken place and is 
still ongoing with the shifting of what were traditionally state’s tasks and responsibilities to 
both the private sector and the civil society. In the case of the trail bridge programme in 
Nepal both processes can be observed. On the one hand, the central government has shifted 
many responsibilities to local authorities, while on the other an overall community approach 
to bridge construction has substituted the previous centralised one, shifting responsibilities to 
civil society actors like (I)NGOs and private agencies. Nowadays, the DDC is officially the 
main actor in trail bridge projects. However, often the state is factually not recognised as an 
important actor in the project: this is because of the long tradition of mistrust in the state, but 
also because of the delegation of many project-related tasks to civil society (TBSU, LSP, 
UC). 
6.5 Public Audit Practice and accountability in other frameworks 
 
Similar issues and problems are found in other applications of PAP in projects outside the 
TBSU. Besides those already described, some other particular issues should be mentioned 
here. The trail bridge project has the characteristic of producing an output – the trail bridge – 
that is a public good: all the people have access to and use the bridge, without 
discrimination. This is not the case for other projects, for example if the output is a small 
irrigation system whose use is reserved to a limited part of the community. In such cases 
transparency and broad information are even more crucial in order to avoid feelings of envy 
and discrimination.  
Another specific characteristic of TBSU is that the bridge is a tangible good. Projects that are 
dealing with tangible outcomes are also called hardware projects in jargon and are 
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juxtaposed to software projects.16 I already analysed the difficulty of people understanding 
the content of a public meeting and the difficulty speakers at the meeting have conveying 
their messages in the case of hardware output like the trail bridge. In the case of software 
projects it is even more difficult. Thus, implementing the PAP in software projects is even 
more challenging and specific tools have to be put in place in order to make the information 
more understandable. Some software programmes of HELVETAS Nepal implement the PAP 
in groups: the meetings are thus not organised with all stakeholders together at the same 
time, but in homogeneous stakeholder groups. This allows the implementers of PAP to focus 
the information and discussions on the interests and capacities of the specific stakeholder 
group. 
We could assess that in the case of other projects accountability also passes through 
different channels than the PAP. Some software projects whose objectives focus on the 
support and empowerment of local authorities implement their accountability by regularly 
presenting their plans and budget in formal meetings with local authorities. Such meetings do 
not fit the definition of PAP, but are important occasions where HELVETAS shares 
information and promotes the discussion of its projects and plans. In this sense, such 
meetings can be also seen as a group-specific PAP. With regards to the broader population, 
projects that have less experience with PAP often implement it in a less formalised way, by 
holding more meetings with less rigidly defined agendas. In this way these projects are 
exploring possibilities to optimise the structure of meetings. Furthermore, in many projects 
the direct accountability of HELVETAS towards beneficiaries passes through other less 
formal mechanisms: for instance some projects have a social mobiliser in their staff. Social 
mobilisers often improvise public meetings whenever and wherever they see the opportunity 
and take the occasion to diffuse information about the project and gather voices from the 
community.  
Among the accountability tools promoted and employed by other organisations in the 
country, I would like to end this chapter with one tool that I find particularly interesting, 
namely the community score card (CSC) (Khadka and Bhattarai 2012; Ackerman 2005). As 
explained above, often citizens lack the opportunity to meet the authorities and discuss 
collective issues with them. Moreover, I assessed a widespread mistrust from citizens 
towards authorities. The CSC is a tool that offers to citizens, authorities and service providers 
an apposite space to meet and discuss collective issues. The procedure of CSC sets the 
focus on the exchange of perspectives and interpretations of the participating entities, 
thereby aiming at building trust among them. Of course, the PAP also creates an interface 
between the community, its representatives (UC, political parties), local authorities (if 
present) and NGOs. However, contrarily to the CSC, PAP’s space is created mostly for a one 
way transmission of information and for the discussion of specific project related issues. 
Although I stated earlier that the PAP's space is often used by the community to discuss 
other, non project related issues, this is not the primary aim of PAP, but rather an unforeseen 
expansion of it.  
 
                                                 
16  Some examples of software projects are the Citizen Action for Results through Transparency and Accountability (CARTA), 
which promotes bottom up monitoring systems for World Bank development projects; the Linking smallholders with local 
institutions and markets (LINK), which develops agricultural skills by villagers and sustains the local authorities in the planning 
process; and the Safer Migration project (SaMi), which acts both at local level by diffusing information about risks and dangers 
of migration and at central level by the policy making. For more information see HELVETAS Nepal website: 
www.helvetasnepal.org.np (accessed 09.10.12).  
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7 Conclusions 
Nepal is today at a turning point in its history. The 240 year long monarchy has been 
transformed into a federal republic after numerous democratic attempts and after a long and 
harmful civil war. Since 2006 Nepal is on its road to building a new – democratic, inclusive 
and stable – state that should be the starting point to finally relieve Nepalis from the difficult 
economic and social conditions that are still limiting their livelihood today. Accountability is a 
central issue on the path towards a new state. In their history, Nepalis have experienced 
many changes in the political situation of their country; accountability and transparency have 
been fundamentally missing from the political culture and Nepali citizens have habitually had 
difficulties in trusting their authorities. Now, with the stalled process of drafting the new 
constitution, there is the hope for setting the framework for an accountable and democratic 
government, but the way is long and full of obstacles.  
For over sixty years ago HELVETAS has been promoting not only economic and social 
development but also democratic culture. In particular, with the tool of Public Audit Practice 
the organisation is trying to diffuse a culture of transparency and accountability between 
actors and in different directions: from HELVETAS towards the state and the beneficiaries as 
well as from the state towards its citizens. This HELVETAS initiative plays out in a context 
where various international and regional agencies are implementing different kinds of 
development projects promoting discourses on participation and democracy to varying 
degrees. However, factual democratic habits and culture are still lacking in the country, with 
the political scenario dominated by individual power struggles around self-interest and by 
widespread corruption.  
7.1 Contextual factors influencing accountability initiatives at the local level 
 
With the present study, we wanted to analyse which contextual factors influence the 
implementation of accountability initiatives at local level. As is the case with democracy, the 
building of accountability and of habits of accountability is a long process in which traditional 
social structures and attitudes are slowly changed. Thus, a single initiative like the one we 
investigated17 cannot change markedly or quickly the social and political scenario of the 
community in which it is implemented. Numerous contextual, long lasting and cultural factors 
influence the attitude of people towards such initiatives and their capacity to meaningfully 
participate in them: 
• The existing (lack of) accountability and transparency practices outside the framework of 
PAP influence the attitude of governmental as well as civil society actors towards 
accountability. In the locations we visited, the broader institutional and political settings 
do not provide incentives for accountable and transparent behaviour of powerful actors.  
• In order to effectively implement accountability and transparency (both inside and 
outside the project), powerful as well as less powerful actors on both sides of the 
accountability relationship (supply and demand side) need to have enough material 
(financial, temporal) and human (cultural, educational) resources, which are often not 
available.  
• Polarised power structures and discriminatory social and cultural traditions relating to 
gender, caste/ethnicity, economic status limit the meaningful participation of traditionally 
                                                 
17 TBSU’s intervention covers all 75 country districts, while the other HELVETAS’s projects are concentrated in 24 districts. PAP 
is implemented in all 14 HELVETAS projects in the country, with the mentioned differences. In 2011 181 new bridges were 
constructed with the support of TBSU and the target for the period 2009-2014 amounts to 2,200 new bridges. HELVETAS 
Nepal’s Annual Report for 2011 relates over 630,000 disadvantaged people (Nepal’s population amounts to over 30 millions 
people) benefitted by HELVETAS’s interventions. (All information from HELVETAS Nepal 2012). 
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disadvantaged groups. These groups are more likely also to face material restraints to 
participation. In a context where a strong local elite controls the community, it is more 
difficult for traditionally excluded people to enter the accountability and information 
systems and to participate in them.  
• The openness and also the capacity of people to participate in accountability and 
transparency processes depends on their familiarity with them. In contexts where 
participatory development interventions are numerous and frequent and where civil 
society is active and vibrant, people are more likely and at ease to participate in 
accountability and transparency processes. However, if the different interventions are not 
well coordinated, their overlap can also create confusion and mistrust.  
• Informal mechanisms of control and information (i.e. of accountability and transparency) 
can be very strong in rural contexts. The kind of links and interplay of such mechanisms 
with more formal mechanisms and tools can strengthen or weaken the latter, and can 
ameliorate or worsen the degree of inclusion in accountability and transparency 
processes.  
• Whenever state actors are involved in accountability and transparency initiatives, the 
legitimacy of the state and the trust (or mistrust) of citizens towards it comes to play an 
important role in such initiatives, influencing the readiness of people to effectively and 
meaningfully interact with authorities.  
7.2 Towards accountable local authorities 
 
Institutional and political settings play a crucial role in the success of accountability initiatives. 
In the current Nepali context, the willingness of local authorities to be accountable to their 
citizens is limited principally by the lack of local elections: officials are appointed by the 
central government and are thus primarily accountable to it. At the same time political 
representatives – who do not hold formal power at the local level, but are still very influential 
– are not elected by citizens and are thus primarily accountable to their parties. Although 
good regulations and frameworks exist on paper, horizontal accountability mechanisms 
within the state are still weak and corruption is widespread because of the lack of a sanctions 
system and the habitual impunity and tolerance of such practices. Local authorities often lack 
the resources and the capacities (and sometimes also the political will) to implement real 
accountability. Social accountability tools like the Public Audit Practice could empower state 
actors in their capacity to be accountable. However, such initiatives have to take into 
consideration the fact that the incentives for state actors to be accountable are lacking and 
should therefore also address the need to create a broader system of incentives.   
The fragility of the national context is manifest at the local level in the lack of local elections, 
frequent changes in the institutional framework, weak horizontal control mechanisms and, in 
general, in a widespread mistrust in authorities and consequent lack of legitimacy of power 
holders. All these elements lead local authorities and party representatives to take a very 
short term perspective and take advantage of current conditions because forecasting the 
future is very difficult. Thus, the instability at national level translates into very short term 
thinking at local level, which leaves space for underperformance by local political actors. 
At the very local level other kinds of accountability mechanisms are playing an important role 
in maintaining minimal stability and responsiveness of local authorities and political parties. 
These are informal mechanisms of control and sanctions, based on social control and 
reputational costs. These kinds of informal mechanisms have the opportunity to work at the 
local level in rural and small scale contexts, where personal relations within the community 
are very tight and where officials and political representatives are at the same time part of the 
community they are working for and representing. The Public Audit Practice can and does 
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take advantage of such informal mechanisms: it can be seen as an institutionalised and 
formal catalyst of more informal processes of control, information and discussion. 
7.3 Towards active and engaged citizens  
 
The diffusion of the Public Audit Practice, embedded in a context of multiple participation and 
accountability initiatives, can contribute to the building of a democratic attitude by both the 
state and citizens. The involvement of people in two participatory spaces – the user 
committee and the Public Audit Practice – represents an important opportunity for 
empowerment and learning technical and social skills. The awareness of citizens about their 
rights and about the responsibilities of power holders is increased, contributing to the building 
of a democratic culture. The active participation of citizens in requesting and promoting social 
accountability is stronger in contexts where people are more accustomed to such practices, 
i.e. in contexts where various initiatives are being implemented. However, the question arises 
of whether what is being diffused is a real democratic culture or only superficial habits of 
democratic discourses, meaninglessly repeated, which do not change the basic traditional 
attitude. With the spread of participatory tools and participatory development initiatives, by 
development agencies as well as by the government, the very meaning of such tools and 
initiatives risks being weakened and becoming a mere formality to be accomplished in order 
to receive funds and projects.  
Initiatives promoting formal accountability tools should take into account the importance of 
informal mechanisms. Formal practices seem often to work by catalysing informal 
mechanisms based on social control and reputational costs. These informal mechanisms 
represent an important asset for improving transparency and accountability. Everyday social 
relations are a very powerful means to diffuse information and to guarantee a degree of 
control over people in power, if those people are also part of the community. However, such 
informal channels are shaped strongly by invisible power structures and social and cultural 
traditions, thereby excluding a large part of the population from information-sharing and 
decision-making processes. 
The same invisible power structures and social and cultural traditions shape the 
implementation of formal mechanisms as well. Such factors limit the meaningful and inclusive 
participation of all citizens, in particular of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Invisible power 
and social structures often go unrecognised and/or unaddressed in the design of 
development initiatives and also in the design of PAP and in the practices and roles 
prescribed for actors. Often participatory practices and instruments end up controlled by local 
elites and already powerful groups, which leads to their further empowerment through the 
benefits provided by the development rent and also in terms of social network building and 
reputation. The topic of elite capture and of the risk of participatory development 
interventions reproducing existent power relations and exclusion patterns is widely discussed 
by authors (Olivier De Sardan 2005; Gaventa 2006; Cornwall and Coelho 2007b) and needs 
deeper reflection by practitioners who promote transparency. Elites are often demonised as 
the local ‘baddies’ and the attitude of practitioners, or at least their rhetoric, is generally to 
avoid them. However, elites play an important role in the community, and their presence can 
be also seen as a resource for development. Thus, in designing development interventions, it 
is crucial to understand the role elites are playing in the community and can play for its 
development18.   
The importance of the participatory spaces – both the Public Audit Practice and user 
committee – in the framework of the community approach to bridge construction was evident 
in this study. The user committee itself can be seen as an accountability tool through which 
                                                 
18 This argument was put forward about national and ruling elites by Hossain and Moore in 2002 (Hossain & Moore 2002) and 
was extended to local elites by, among others, Dabo et al (n.d.) and World Bank 2008. 
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the community holds local authorities and NGOs to account. Regarding the inclusiveness of 
the user committee, we noticed the same problems described above: social and cultural 
traditions are limiting the inclusiveness of the user committee as well. 
While we have not studied any ‘counterfactual’ evidence from a non fragile setting, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the fragility of the context exacerbates all the described factors: 
for instance the low effectiveness of public services limits the economic and social 
development of communities, thereby limiting their capacities and possibilities to 
meaningfully participate. Moreover, the weak legitimacy of the state present at the national 
as well as the local level leads to the consequent mistrust of people in their state at all levels, 
which again limits the motivation of people to participate.  
8 Recommendations and perspectives 
8.1 General recommendations 
 
• I highlighted many times in this report the crucial role of power: in the framework of a 
development intervention existing power relations and social structures have to be 
analysed in depth in order to take advantage of their positive potentials and to minimise 
the negative ones. This concerns the structures of invisible power and the problem of 
elite capture among others.  
• The crucial role played by elite and powerful people in development intervention must be 
recognised. Stigmatising elites as something (always and only) negative should be 
avoided and, at the same time, their positive potential should be recognised. In doing 
this, it is important to consider the power of such elites and develop strategies to control 
and ‘direct’ it towards positive outcomes for the whole community.  
• This report underlined also the importance of informal accountability mechanisms: the 
challenge is to make the most of the potential of such mechanisms and at the same time 
to find ways to include disadvantaged people in them. At the same time, it is important to 
reflect about the relationship between informal and formal mechanisms, thereby 
questioning whether formal mechanisms are always the optimal way in contexts where 
informal channels predominate. 
• I ascertained that factual inclusion is not always guaranteed in formal accountability 
mechanisms. Therefore, as for the already cited informal mechanisms, it is important to 
invest some energy in thinking how to also include disadvantaged people more 
effectively in formal mechanisms of accountability and transparency.   
• It is important to act on both sides of the accountability relation, especially to work to 
empower citizens in their awareness and capacity to promote accountability (demand 
side) as well as to motivate local authorities to be accountable and to give them the 
necessary capacities (supply side). However, these processes of empowerment should 
be thought through by considering the broader contextual factors, which can present 
conditions that hamper the real implementation of such initiatives. Depending on the 
openness of governments, there could be also room for intervention on such hampering 
contextual factors (i.e. policy making and concrete implementation).  
• Of course, many of the factors I cited in this report as having an influence on 
accountability initiatives are very broad and complex and are beyond the reach of a 
single project or programme like the Trail Bridge Support Unit or the Public Audit 
Practice. Furthermore, social and cultural structures and habits require consistent efforts 
over a long time to be changed. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the social 
and cultural restraints people are facing while engaging in a specific project, in order to 
reduce their negative hampering impact. An objective of development intervention could, 
consequently, also be the challenging of such restraints, for instance acting directly on  
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• gender and caste/ethnic discrimination and on education, or trying to limit the described 
material restraints to participation.  
8.2 HELVETAS Nepal specific recommendations  
 
• In the context of Nepal, where state is in transition and its legitimacy and effectiveness 
are weak, it is even more crucial that engagement pays particular attention to the 
empowerment of governmental institutions in their capacity and willingness to be 
accountable towards their citizens. HELVETAS already undertook this by including in its 
programmes the empowerment of state actors.  
• The very vital civil society, with the spread of CBOs and NGOs in recent times, has 
important potential for Nepal. Indeed, CBOs and grassroots movements are the 
elements that allowed the continuity of everyday life at local level despite the important 
(and sometimes dramatic) changes at the central level. Thus, it is important to invest 
resources and energies at the grassroots level, strengthening the potential of such 
organisations to manage and direct development at the local level. 
• The spread of (I)NGOs and CBOs leads to the risk of overlapping and increasing 
confusion if interventions and discourses are not harmonised on a common ground. It is 
important to consider the influence of other interventions and programmes and to take 
the advantage of possible synergies, while paying attention to possible confusing 
overlaps. 
• Nepal is mostly a rural country; the considerations emphasised above about social 
control and informal mechanisms of transparency and accountability are particularly 
important. However, marginalisation patterns are still strong and are based mostly on 
gender and caste/ethnicity. Thus, even more strongly in Nepal, it is crucial to pay 
particular attention on the inclusion of marginalised people in such informal as well as in 
formal mechanisms.  
8.3 PAP and TBSU specific recommendations 
 
• PAP represents an opportunity to empower both state actors and the community. It also 
represents an opportunity for these actors to meet. However, I emphasised that often 
participation is limited by social, cultural and practical restraints, which should be 
considered in the implementation of the initiative. Thus, it is important not only to 
guarantee a formal participation of disadvantaged people with the fulfilment of quotas, 
but also to empower them in order to guarantee their meaningful participation. This, of 
course, is almost beyond the reach of a small intervention, yet some measures can be 
taken to improve the possibilities of people to meaningfully participate, for instance 
through trainings on specific skills. Moreover, attention should be paid not to overburden 
people with tasks and responsibilities. Indeed, it happens often that few people carry out 
many positions in different projects and this limits their meaningful participation. It is 
necessary to involve other people, who perhaps do not have the experience or the 
education required for the project, but who can be trained in order to acquire the 
necessary competencies. Attention should be paid to the selection process of user 
committee members, who often are ‘forced’ to engage in the committee because of their 
experience, but who can then not afford the time for the many tasks and responsibilities. 
In order to act on these problems, tight social mobilisation is needed that should be 
sensible about such issues: local service providers can play a more crucial role here.  
• The considerations of the previous point apply also to the problem of elite capture. By 
widening the range of people engaging in social work (for instance in the user 
committee), power is shared with more people, thereby limiting the monopoly of elites. It 
is also necessary to think about other strategies to limit and/or control elites’ power in the 
framework of development projects.  
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• In order to build a trustful relationship between state and citizens, it is important to be 
aware of the symbolic potential of the space of PAP, which can be used to promote the 
image and the engagement of local authorities towards the community. Thus, I suggest 
that local authorities should play a more active role during meetings, so that people can 
recognise their important role in the projects.  
• As ascertained in this report, the creation of an interactive interface between 
communities and authorities on issues broader than a specific project is not the explicit 
aim of PAP. Rather, the discussion of broader community issues is a secondary 
extension of PAP. Nevertheless, I hold that the creation of such interfaces is of primary 
importance in the building of a trusting relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Therefore the possibility of broadening such interfaces within the framework of PAP or in 
other frameworks could be considered (an interesting example I mentioned are 
community score cards, which for instance could be introduced in the project cycle).  
• During PAP meetings the information sharing process can be improved. Indeed, I 
underlined in the report that the public often does not grasp the content of the meetings. 
Therefore, it is important to think about other ways of communicating and delivering 
messages and information. For instance, rhetorical and theoretical speeches could be 
limited and the focus can be set on concrete issues. Visualisation tools like hoarding 
boards can also be useful.  
• Particular attention should be given also to the process of information sharing before the 
implementation phase of projects. People should be better informed about, for example, 
the possibility of applying for a trail bridge.  
• In the balance between informal and formal tools, information can be shared and voices 
can be collected not only through official meetings like the ones we attended, but also 
through informal conversations. Some HELVETAS Nepal projects are already 
experiencing communication forms at the middle way between formal and informal, for 
instance with improvised public meetings to share information about the projects.  
• Very frequently, in the implementation of trail bridge projects problems arise with 
fabricators and contractors. These problems have consequences also on the image of 
the user committee and of the other actors. Therefore, the accountability of these private 
sector actors should be strengthened also.  
8.4 Perspectives 
 
This study explored the contextual factors that can influence the success of accountability 
initiatives in some specific cases in Nepal. The research questions were very broad and the 
objective was to really explore all possible factors. We employed a qualitative case study 
approach, which, for the reasons explained in the fifth chapter, was the approach that better 
suited the study’s aim. In this way we could gather a large amount of information including 
possible correlations. However, the resources for this research project did not allow 
deepening the analysis of the single themes and issues. Thus, my observations are often 
very general and further – qualitative and quantitative – research is needed to assess the 
real importance and influence of the factors identified.  
 
In the field I focused my attention mostly on people of the community, in particular on the 
members of the trail bridge user committee. On the one hand this allowed me to analyse in 
depth the space of the user committee, but on the other I might have paid too limited 
attention to DDC and VDC officials. Thus, this report reflects rather the views and 
perceptions of the community than the ones of state actors. Further research should analyse 
the behaviour and strategies of individual officers.  
 
Moreover, the situation of the country is changing very rapidly. Hence, some of my 
observations about the institutional settings of accountability may become obsolete very 
soon. However, cultural and social factors and habits will not change soon and therefore the 
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observations about such issues will probably still be relevant at least in the medium term. In 
the next months many things will happen in the country and I am close to the hope of Nepalis 
and Nepal’s friends that the country will soon have a new constitution. Thus, further 
investigation should continuously follow the happenings in the country in order to observe 
how the new developments will influence accountability issues.  
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Annex I: Visited locations 
 
Ramechhap District (Public Review) 
As first field experience, we visited the Ramechhap District in the middle hills of the 
Central Region attending a Public Review. This first field visit was very short: we stayed just 
the day of the meeting, having yet the opportunity to hold few (formal and informal) interviews 
with the collaborators of the project. This first visit served mostly as a test for the 
methodology and for modus operandi of the team. The access to the field (in this case just 
the access to the meeting and the contact with a DDC official) was ensured by the TBSU 
staff.  
The trail bridge links two villages perched on the steep slopes of two opposite 
mountains. The site is quite remote in the middle hills and the main activity is subsistence as 
well as cash crops agriculture. In the very short visit we could not analyse the social 
organisation of the village. However, we could guess a traditional organisation, with men 
holding a higher social position than women and with caste and ethnicity still playing an 
important role in the social structure. A river marks the border between the two villages but 
also between two different VDCs (Phulasi and Dandakharka) and DDCs (Ramechhap and 
Charikot). The village on the left bank (in Dandakharka VDC) is better connected to the main 
road, while the village on the right side (in Phulasi VDC) is linked to the main road by a very 
steep and rough road. The right side village is the one that more needs the trail bridge, it was 
the initiator of the project and it invested considerably more money and resources in the 
bridge construction. Dandakharka VDC and Charikot DDC participated in a very limited way 
to the project. Moreover, some conflicts rose when Dandakharka VDC Secretary was 
transferred and his successor refused to provide the money promised by his predecessor. 
The main implementer of the project was Ramechhap DDC. This DDC habitually works 
without the intermediation of Local Service Providers; instead of that, it implements directly 
the technical as well as the social part of the projects in the district. Thus, no Local Service 
Provider was involved in the trail bridge construction. The DDC decided to stop working with 
local NGOs because of two reasons: first, because according to the opinion of a DDC 
engineer the NGOs that are active in the district do not have enough qualification and 
capacities to implement a project. Second, again according to the engineer, because NGOs 
in the district were highly politicised. Beside the TBSU staff other main actors in the project 
were Phulasi VDC and the User Committee, composed mainly by villagers from the right 
side. A main issue of the Public Review we attended was the search for additional money: 
the actual costs of the trail bridge were higher than the estimated ones. In fact, we attended 
the second Public Review for that bridge. The bridge was already finished and a Public Audit 
should have taken place. However, there was a problem with the fabricator of some steel 
parts, who delivered material of a quality lower than promised. The (Ramechhap) DDC 
engineer successfully solved the problem by writing him a warning letter requesting to 
replace at his costs all the concerned parts with the threat of effacing him from the list of 
contractors working with that DDC.  
 
Surkhet District (Public Hearing) 
The second field visit in the Surkhet District in the middle hills of the Western Region 
began with the observation of the Public Hearing, after which the two students stayed in the 
village for one week. The access to the community was ensured by TBSU staff, which 
introduced us to a man who holds a central position in the trail bridge User Committee and 
who became our guide in the village. Thanks to his tight organisation we could hold a high 
number of interviews and meetings in the very short time of our visit, not only in Ratamata 
(the village) but also in neighbouring villages in the same VDC (Mehelkuna). However, the 
presence of the man, who was very often at our side during both formal and informal 
interactions, strongly influenced the answers and the openness of our interlocutors. As the 
process of bridge construction was at the very beginning, the LSP was not strongly linked to 
the community yet. Therefore, the interaction with the LSP was not central in the organisation 
of the fieldwork.  
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Ratamata has many common points with the village in Ramechhap. It is also located in 
the middle hills, in a quite remote area. The geography of the mountains is less steep, but 
there is no direct road connection to the market and to the main road. A trail connects the 
village with the market and passes through a river that is harmless in the dry season, but 
dangerous in the rainy months. Ratamata is very small (around 35 households) and the very 
basic livelihood rests mainly on subsistence as well as cash crops agriculture. The poverty 
level in the village is still high; however, in the last decade several development activities 
took place, as for example the construction of an irrigation system, the sanitation 
infrastructures and the formation of many community based organisations for the collective 
management of local resources. It seems that the Maoist insurgency did not strongly touch 
Ratamata, because of its remote location and poverty. There are only few high-caste 
households, while the rest are low-caste ones (Dalit). The different castes are quite well 
integrated: Dalit personalities hold elite positions in the village. Another main characteristic of 
Ratamata is the very high rate of migration: very few young men were to see in the village, as 
most had migrated abroad and are sending more or less regularly remittance to the families. 
The strong migration of course has changed the social structure of the village, with women 
carrying many familiar and collective responsibilities at the same time. Nevertheless, the 
predominance of males is still strong and the few men left exercise a strong power in the 
community. Other villages around Ratamata will benefit from the bridge. Those other villages 
are bigger, better connected to communication routes and their migration rate is lower. 
Ratamata, being the main beneficiary of the trail bridge, was also its initiator. The main role in 
the project is played by the most influential man in Ratamata (our guide), a young low-caste 
man who made his way to gain more wealth and power and who now counts as the ‘chief’ of 
the village. The Public Hearing took place normally and without particular issues or conflicts.  
 
Chitwan District (Public Audit) 
The third field visit was the longest one: the two students stayed for around three weeks 
in Kumroj VDC in the Chitwan District in the Tarai flatland of the Central Region. The Public 
Audit took place at the end of the stay. Some daily visits to the district capital allowed us to 
meet LSP staff as well as a journalist and one of the DDC officials responsible for the trail 
bridge. The access to the field was ensured by the direct contact with the LSP, which had a 
very tight contact with, and knowledge about, the community. The LSP introduced us to two 
men who were playing a central role in the trail bridge project. Both men were our key 
persons in the village, but one in particular was our guide and is at the same time one of the 
most influential people in Kumroj. Contrarily to the previous experience, the role of the guide 
was much more limited: apart from providing us some contacts and from organising few 
meetings, he did not interfere in the interviews and interactions with local people. However, 
people of the village knew about our tight contact with him, which could in some way 
influence their answers and limit their openness to us.  
The context in Chitwan is very different from the previous two. Kumroj VDC is situated in 
the Tarai flatland in the South of the country and is very near to the Chitwan National Park, 
which brings to the region (and to Kumroj) many tourists every day. Being on a flatland, the 
whole region enjoys good communication facilities, electricity facilities, irrigation facilities and 
other ‘modern’ comforts; moreover, the land is fertile and there is good water supply. The 
agriculture, which is the main income source in the region, is much more modernised than 
the traditional one in the hills. Tourism is another important income source for local 
authorities, for community organisations as well as for the single households. Kumroj VDC, 
with more than 800 households, does not present a very high poverty rate, but still about 30 
percent of the population is living with a food sufficiency of less than six months (data from 
the VDC). The education level is higher than in the middle hills and many young people 
continue their studies after the compulsory school. The village and its neighbourhood 
enjoyed in the past and still enjoy a large amount of development aid from outside. This aid 
comes both from regular governmental and non-governmental organisations (including 
HELVETAS) and from donations and projects by individual tourists. The high number of 
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‘social work’19 projects and activities creates in the village a tight network between people 
working in such activities: single people cover various positions in various projects. In that 
way social work, beside the traditional differences of caste/ethnicity, gender, age, education 
and economic status, represents in the village an important variable of the social organisation 
of the community. During the Maoist insurgency, combatants regularly visited the village in 
order to collect food and other crucial resources. Part of the village elite was threatened and 
had to flee away from the village. Those people could come back to the village only after the 
end of the civil war. Who did not flee stayed in the village, but had to stop all social work 
activities, in addition to paying high amounts of money.  
The story of the trail bridge is long and confused. A bridge in the same location of ‘our’ 
trail bridge should have been built already some years ago. The project had already been 
approved, but for some reasons the bridge was ‘shifted’ to another location, but still in Kumroj 
VDC. After some years, an influencing man of the community (who was also our guide and 
donated the land for the bridge on the right bank) together with some friends applied for a 
trail bridge in the actual location. In fact, a cemented bridge would have been more 
appreciated by the population (on both sides a carriageable road ends on the river where is 
located the trail bridge), but it was easier to get funds for a trail bridge. Finally, a trail bridge 
was built to link Kumroj VDC with the other (right) bank (Bachhyauli VDC), where important 
facilities are available (school, market). Bachhyauli VDC felt less the need for the bridge: the 
most important benefit is the link with a nearer health post in Kumroj VDC. The User 
Committee was composed mostly by people from Kumroj: members from Bachhyauli often 
did not participate to the meetings. The construction of the bridge lasted three years. The 
long construction time was due to a more difficult technique, but also to some delays in the 
delivering of the promised budget by the DDC as well as problems with the material delivered 
by the fabricator. Indeed, the delivered material was different to the booked one and needed 
to be changed. During the Public Audit, beside the traditional presentation of the final work 
and the creation of the Bridge Maintenance Committee, these problems were presented and 
explained to the public.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Intended as per definition in footnote 11. 
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Annex II: Governance structure in Nepal 
 
 
Lo
ca
l 
WARD 
It is the smallest institutional entity. Electors at ward level 
select their representatives in the Ward Committee, 
which does not have administrative authority but only 
defined roles in the planning process.  
VILLAGE 
Also generally called VDC, it is normally composed of 
nine Wards: the Village Council, composed by the Ward 
Committees’ chairpersons, is the legislative body. The 
Village Development Committee (VDC) is the executive 
and autonomous local body and is lead by elected 
representatives. In addition to them the VDC Secretary, 
who is also part of the VDC, is not elected but appointed 
by the central government. The VDC is the smallest body 
with administrative authority, decision power about the 
allocation of resources and right to collect taxes. In urban 
areas the VDC is substituted by the Municipality with 
similar structure, roles, responsibilities and authority.  
 ILAKA It gathers many VDCs, but has only an advisory role. 
N
at
io
na
l 
DISTRICT 
Also generally called DDC, it is the next level and is 
organised with a similar structure like the Village. The 
District Council is the legislative body and the District 
Development Committee (DDC) is the executive one; the 
Local Development Officer (LDO, the correspondent of 
the VDC Secretary) is appointed by the central 
government. 
DEVELOPMENT 
REGION 
Like the Ilaka, it does not have administrative authority.  
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Together with its Ministries it represents the last 
administrative level. 
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Annex III: The steps of the Public Audit Practice  
 
 
 PUBLIC HEARING (PH) PUBLIC REVIEW (PR) PUBLIC AUDIT (PA) 
Chronology During the planning 
phase of the project. 
During the 
implementation phase of 
the project. It usually 
takes place once, but can 
be repeated if necessary. 
It is the last step of the 
project. 
Facilitator Local Service Provider User Committee User Committee 
Content Information about the 
planned activities, the 
planned costs and 
funding, the necessary 
participation of the 
community in terms of 
work and money, the role 
and responsibilities of the 
different stakeholders 
and other basic data are 
discussed. The aim of PH 
is to inform the 
community about the 
project, integrate its 
opinion and requirements 
in the planning and 
develop a common 
understanding among all 
the stakeholders before 
starting the actual work. 
The aim of the PR is to 
assess the progress and 
performance of all the 
stakeholders, to inform 
the community about the 
state of the works and 
budget and to discuss 
possible problems that 
arise during the 
implementation. 
It marks the end of the 
project with the 
approbation by the 
community from 
technical, social, 
managerial and financial 
perspective. The planning 
of the steps following the 
completion of the project 
(e.g. Bridge Maintenance 
Committee) is also an 
issue of PA. 
(see HELVETAS Switzerland n.d.a) 
 57 
Annex IV: Trail bridge construction process 
 
In the following table are presented the steps for the construction of a trail bridge, with 
particular attention on the actors involved and their roles and responsibilities (HELVETAS 
Nepal 2006b). 
 
A A community applies for a trail bridge and sends the request to the DDC 
through the VDC. 
B The DDC collects all applications and compiles a prioritised list of possible 
trail bridges. 
C The DDC lists are sent to the central Department, which compiles a 
prioritised list, too. 
D In the selected bridge locations, a Local Service Provider (LSP) is hired by 
the DDC (together with TBSU) to provide technical and social support. 
E After the feasibility studies by the LSP together with TBSU, a Public Hearing 
is organised by the LSP. 
F The Bridge User Committee (UC) is formed mostly during the Public Hearing. 
G The UC will be responsible for the bridge for the whole duration of the works, 
continuously supported technically and socially by the LSP and punctually 
technically by the TBSU. The latter supports the government with technical 
assistance at the central and local level. 
H The VDC, after the process of application, does not have an active role in the 
bridge construction: its task is to provide the accorded money in time. 
I Contrarily to the VDC, the DDC plays an important role during the whole 
bridge construction: it has, of course, to provide the accorded budget 
(transferred to it by the central government from the fund basket of the 
Swap), but also technical support to the UC through the engineers of the 
District Technical Office (DTO) and it has to manage the acquisition of 
specialised material by external fabricators. Moreover, the DTO monitors the 
bridge construction throughout the project cycle. 
J The community has to provide its support through (partially paid) labour and 
material. 
K One or more Public Review is held during the works and are organised by 
the UC with the support of the LSP. 
L Finally, the UC, always with the support of the LSP, organises the Public 
Audit for the completion of the project.  
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Annex V: The role of the user committee 
 
The first diagram shows how, despite inclusiveness on paper, the meaningful participation in 
the user committee is often limited to high caste men. The second diagram simplifies the 
relations between the different actors and shows the intermediary position of the user 
committee, between the community of beneficiaries and the other actors. The arrows 
represent interactions that regard the trail bridge project. Of course, local bodies, the TBSU 
and the LSP also interact with the beneficiaries, but the arrows are not sketched because this 
interaction is mostly limited to the specific space of the Public Audit Practice (and in the case 
of LSP to the very first phase of the project).  
 
 
Inclusiveness of the User 
Committee. The two half-
circles show the proportion of 
high/low-castes in the 
community. The scala for the 
grey areas are the diagonal 
lines and not the angles: the 
more people of the group 
participate in the UC, the 
more external is the 
intersection on the diagonal 
lines. The diagram does not 
lies on specific data, but is 
only a very rough 
representation.  
 
 
 
  
MEN WOMEN 
Disadvantaged 
castes 
/ethnic groups 
 
 
High-castes 
Others Others 
 
High-castes 
Disadvantaged 
castes 
/ethnic groups 
Representation in the 
User Committee 
Small group that most 
actively works in the User 
Committee  
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The role of the User Committee: the diagram shows 
the interactions between the different actors, 
regarding the trail bridge construction. The dimension 
of the circles and of the lines does not represent any 
variable. 
  
CG: Central government 
LB: Local bodies  
